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Abstract 
The Ukrainian agro-food sector encountered a difficult transformation in the 1990s. The 
production of agriculture decreased to approximately a half in the 1990s. The same 
holds for the food processing industry. This study concentrates at the chain of various 
economic agents, the cooperation of which is required until the primary agricultural 
production is brought to the stage of final consumption in the food industry. These 
agents of the agro-food value chain were not, however, in equal bargaining positions 
when they had to adapt by restructuring during the previous decade of transition.  
This report fulfils three tasks. First, it describes and analyses the basic changes that have 
taken place in the agro-food sector of Ukraine. Second, it introduces the global 
commodity chain (GCC) approach into studying the agro-food sector of the countries of 
the former Soviet Union (FSU). The major concepts of the approach, like producer-
driven and buyer-driven dichotomy, chain governance and upgrading, are reviewed. 
Third, the study focuses on four value chains of the agro-food sector: sugar, sunflower, 
grain and dairy.  
The report restricts its focus on the first nine years of independence, i.e. 1992-2000 and, 
in particular, on the second half of the 1990s. The material of the report was initially 
conducted during a research project on the recent development and future prospects of 
the Ukrainian agro-food sector financed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry of 
Finland in 2001. 
One of the conclusions of this report is that a dual food market emerged in the 1990s 
and especially the traditional value chain – large farms, large processing companies and 
retail trade – found it very hard to adapt. This study explains what agents of the chain 
have been more likely to become the governors dominating the chain. The fundamental 
change of the agro-food sector was that new governing structures emerged gradually in 
the 1990s. Food processing enterprises and enterprise structures from outside the agro-
food sector possessed several critical assets to overcome the inadequacies of transition 
economies. For example, these governors of the chain possessed access to capital and 
that was very important because the banking system was not working properly. On the 
contrary, one important reason for the unfavorable position of farms in the value chain 
was that they were not able to use land as a collateral, which denied the access to 
capital.  
The GCC approach proved to be a suitable analytical framework for analysing the agro-
food sector of Ukraine. One of the conclusions of the study is that the GCC approach 
can explain the differences in the performances of the different agents of the food chain. 
In addition, the constructed view of the Ukrainian agro-food sector established in the 
report contributes to the discussion about the GCC approach in general. 
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The Agro-Food Sector of the Ukraine:  Analysis of Transition  
by Means of the Global Commodity Chain Approach 
Antti Helanterä 
1 Introduction 
The Ukrainian agro-food sector encountered a complete change in the 1990s. Upon 
becoming independent in 1991, Ukraine inherited an agro-food sector that had been 
planned to function as part of the national economy of the Soviet Union. Many 
important parts of its agro-food sector were based on functioning without competition in 
the protected market of the Soviet Union.   
In the 1990s, it met tough competition in the domestic and market and the sector was 
unable to adapt. Moreover, it encountered competition in the Russian food market, 
which opened up for competition in 1992. The same holds for the other CIS countries as 
well. The change put the whole agro-food value chain in difficulty. Agricultural 
production dropped to about half in the 1990s, as did the production of food processing 
industry. Poor performance has been rooted both in the agro-food sector itself as well as 
the overall development of economy. In spite of the adverse development of the agro-
food sector in general, the favorable development of certain sub-sectors in the 1990s 
demonstrated how the changed environment affects the sub-sectors in different ways. 
There have been sectors that have been hit hard, but also sectors that have adapted 
comparatively well. In a conditions of very limited government support, the 
competitiveness in the domestic and export markets has dictated the performance of the 
entire value-added chain including farm level and processing industry. This study 
focuses both on success stories as well as failures.  
Despite the amount of people – approximately 50 millions - living in Ukraine and, in 
particular, the large amount and good quality of arable land and the importance of the 
agro-food sector to its national economy, a relatively limited amount of academic 
interest has been devoted to the agro-food sector of Ukraine. Of course, there are several 
studies (see, for example Bostyn & Boutsyn 2001; Gorton et al. 2002; Pugachov & Van 
Atta 2000; Striewe 2001) on the issue, but Russia’s agro-food sector as well as the agro-
food sectors of East European countries have attracted more attention (for example, 
Gardner & Serova 2002; Ioffe & Nefedova 2001a, Ioffe & Nefedova 2001b, Karlova et 
al 2001; Serova 2000; Wegren 1996). Most of the studies on Ukrainian agro-food sector 
focus on the agriculture perhaps including the procurement practices of food processing 
industry (see Gorton et al. 2003), what is a too narrow approach.  
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Most of the studies do not demonstrate a complete picture of the changes taken place in 
the agro-food sector. In particular, the entire value chain – including food market – must 
be given special emphasis. Not only the separate parts of the value-added chain are 
important, but also the institutions involved in the governance of the value chain.  
The operational principles of the agro-food value chain in the Soviet Union had not 
been prepared for adaptation to changes taken place in the 1990s. Agriculture had 
specialized in production. Logistics and storage had been managed in separate 
organizations, and food processing by the food processing industry. The food market 
was seriously neglected. Nowhere in the chain were initiative, profitability or marketing 
skills required. The production scale was also large, demanding large amounts of inputs 
in primary production and industry. Also, the amount of production in Ukraine had not 
been targeted to its domestic consumption only but, instead, for the consumption of the 
entire Soviet Union. Purchasing power diminished and the demand for certain goods 
decreased substantially in the 1990s. As a result, the previous volumes of production 
were no longer needed. The agro-food value chain faced two tasks. First, it was obliged 
to downscale the production volumes. Second, it was obliged to adapt to compete in the 
retail market. Instead of focusing strictly on agriculture, this study stresses the 
importance of the entire value-added chain and explores the adaptation of the entire 
chain.  
This study sets out to fulfil three tasks. First, it describes and analyses the basic changes 
that have taken place in the agro-food sector of Ukraine. The changed structures of 
agriculture, processing industry and food-market are reviewed. Second, it introduces the 
global commodity chain (GCC) approach into studying the agro-food sector of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Compared to other studies on the GCC 
approach, this study gives less emphasis on retail trade. The importance of food retail 
sales in the total consumption diminished in the 1990s and its structures do not resemble 
the retail trade in developed countries, mainly because the structure of the retail market 
is more fragmented. The GCC approach has mostly studied cross-border trade and, in 
particular, the position of the agro-food sectors of developing countries in terms of 
exports to the markets of developed countries. It is interesting to note that concerning 
Ukraine and FSU-markets we actually perceive a transformation process in which a 
value chain that once functioned within one country is being transformed to a cross-
country one. This paper explores to what extent there are differences in cross-border 
value chains and their counterparts within one country and whether the concepts of the 
GCC approach can be used to study value chains within one country. In particular, the 
study focuses on issue of chain governance. In doing so, it seeks to answer following 
questions. How is the Ukrainian agro-food trade organized? What are its power 
dynamics like? In particular, it analyses what was the outcome of the reforms from the 
vantage point of chain governance. To sum up, the study focuses on the development of 
the agro-food sector in Ukraine and introduces the commodity chain approach to 
analyze it. 
Third, the study focuses on four value chains of the agro-food sector. The volume of 
primary production, the production of processed goods and in three cases exports are 
described and analysed. Apart from reviewing these quantitative changes, these sub-
sectors are analysed using the framework of GCC approach. The paper seeks to 
ascertain whether the framework of GCC is suitable for analysing the post-Soviet agro-
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food sector. Moreover, it seeks to contribute to the GCC approach by enriching the 
discussion within it. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the literature about the 
GCC approach. The major concepts of the approach like producer-driven and buyer-
driven dichotomy, chain governance and upgrading are presented. The third section 
presents, first, an overall picture of the development the agro-food sector and the food 
market in the 1990s. Special emphasis is given to the fragmentation of agricultural 
production, diminished purchasing power, the decreased volume of food industry 
production and dual structure of food market. The second part of the section focuses on 
the structural development of the agro-food commodity chain in Ukraine in the 1990s. It 
analyzes the possibilities of each part of the chain – mainly agriculture and food 
processing industry – to adapt to changed operating environment. The importance of the 
food processing industry in the recovery of the sector is stressed. Towards the end, the 
section discusses the need to extend producer/buyer driven dichotomy to meet the needs 
of the research concerning the FSU countries. In particular, the section argues that there 
are certain specificities in Ukrainian operating environment calling for an extension of 
the framework of the GCC approach. The fourth section focuses on the agro-food sub-
sectors using the framework of the GCC approach. The sub-sectors studied are sugar, 
sunflower, dairy and grain.  
The material of the study was initially conducted during a research project on the recent 
development of the Ukrainian agro-food sector financed by the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry of Finland in 2001. The task they set to the author was to analyze the major 
trends and overall development of the Ukrainian agro-food sector. Therefore, the 
material was compiled on most of the sub-sectors. The initial project did not allow 
concentrating on separate sub-sectors.  
This report focuses on the development particularly in the late 1990s. The last year our 
statistics cover is year 2000. This particular year can be regarded as starting point of the 
recovery of the sector. It would perhaps have been fruitful to include the following year 
2001 into this research to be able to compare the period of decreasing production to the 
period of recovery. The initial material, however, did not allow that. In the last section 
the development on the sector in this decade is very briefly discussed.   
The structure of the research is rooted in the initial report. The task was then to explore 
the development in general and review as many of the sub-sectors as possible. 
Consequently, the initial research did not allow conducting very thorough research on 
any of the sub-sectors and, as a result, this report follows the same path.  
In addition, this report does not set out to make exact calculations on the issues – like 
distribution of income within the chain – involved. Instead, it sets out to construct a 
structured analysis about the development of the Ukrainian agro-food sector and, in 
particular, to introduce the GCC approach to studies on the agro-food sector of the FSU 
countries. 
Statistical data about the Ukrainian exports was acquired from State Committee of 
Statistics of Ukraine in Kiev. The statistical data on Russia’s imports is mostly based on 
the Customs Statistics of the Russian Federation. The author is aware of the 
inadequacies of the statistics. Concerning sugar, however, additional sources have been 
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used (Hilz-Ward 2001). The differences between the sources are pointed out. In 
addition, in order to acquire an understanding of the transformation process of the 
Ukrainian agro-food sector in general, a number of interviews were conducted and a 
wide range of literature used. The list of interviewed is presented in the end. They 
represent a wide range of organizations involved in the agro-food sector including 
government officials, representatives of international organizations (World Bank, 
EBRD, IMF) and commercial organizations involved in the production and marketing 
of agricultural machinery and equipment for food-processing enterprises as well as 
food-processing enterprises and market analysts studying the agro-food sector.   
2 Global Commodity Chain Approach (GCC) 
2.1 GCC and Countries in Transition 
Discussion of global scale economic trends is inherently a large and unwieldy topic. The 
same holds for the studies of economies in transition and their integration into the world 
economy. Research tools are required to block out some of the noise to be able to focus 
on the essentials. For the last ten years, the aim of the countries in transition has been to 
integrate into the world economy. The level of success has varied and, as a rule, the 
countries of the former Soviet Union have succeeded worse than most of the East 
European countries entering the European union. By numerous variables Ukraine has 
succeeded only modestly. For example, it has attracted much less FDIs than the Eastern 
European countries now entering European union and exports consist mainly of 
unprocessed goods. For example, metals and minerals accounted for 54 % of exports in 
2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001a).  
Upon coming independent, Ukraine had great hopes in its agro-food sector. After 
decades of supplying Russia and other Soviet republics with agro-food goods as a part 
of the system of the inter-republican exchange of goods, independent Ukraine was 
expecting to be able to conquer to new export markets and to rely on its agro-food 
sector. The harsh reality of the 1990s revealed that conquering new export markets was 
not easy and even maintaining position in the Russian market appeared to be difficult. 
Also, it met a stiff competition at domestic market.   
If we want to shed light on the underlying reasons of Ukraine’s performance in the 
agro-food sector and the export of agro-food goods and especially the impact of export 
in domestic agents of the value chain, we must choose research tools carefully. The 
statistics of the performance of agro-food sector and foreign trade offer an incomplete 
picture tending to hide a more detailed and intricate picture. There are significant 
differences between the different sub-sectors of the agro-food sector. Suitable research 
tool is required to be able to focus on separate value chains.  
The global commodity chain (GCC) approach was originally introduced by Gereffi 
(Gereffi 1994; see also Gereffi 1999; Gereffi 2001). The first publication studied the 
impact of US supermarkets on food production in developing countries (Gereffi 1994). 
From the very beginning, its focus has been on the international trade and, in particular, 
on the exports of the developing countries. Although not all of his publications have 
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focused on agro-food sector, the sector has been given a special emphasis among the 
studies of the GCC approach by other scholars (Dolan & Humphrey 2000; Dolan & 
Tewari 2001; Fitter & Kaplinsky 2001; Gibbon 2001a; Gibbon 2001b; Gwynne 1999; 
Humphrey & Schmitz 2001; Kaplan & Kaplinsky 1999; Kaplinsky 2000; Raikes et al. 
2000; Stevens 2001).  
Although the GCC approach has mostly been used to analyze the integration of 
developing countries into the world economy and their export performance, it has 
several valuable and useful characteristics to be used in analyzing the integration of 
transition economies into the world economy and, in particular, the performances of 
their agro-food sectors. The approach will be briefly reviewed below, but some basic 
notes are necessary here. First, it focuses on the entire value chain, an issue being 
argued to be important in several studies on agro-food sector in Russia and Ukraine 
(Helanterä 1999; Helanterä 2001; Ioffe & Nefedova 2001a, Ioffe & Nefedova 2001b, 
Karlova et al. 2001; Serova 2000; Wegren 1996). These studies have not, however, been 
connected to the discussion of GCC approach. Second, the GCC has devoted special 
attention to chain governance, an issue also discussed more thoroughly below. Third, 
the GCC approach regards the level of value chain of separate commodities to be the 
proper level and scale of analysis. Therefore, the existing literature offers a good deal of 
comparison. Still, some particular goods and their commodity chains dominate the 
discussion and new goods and the new group of countries can contribute to discussion 
on the GCC approach.  
The GCC focuses on the organizational aspects of international trade, on the whole 
range of activities from primary production to final consumption (for example, Fitter & 
Kaplinsky 2001), and to the linkages binding them. The GCC seeks to understand how 
the key or lead agents establish, co-ordinate, and control the linkages and flows of 
produce between input-suppliers, processors, primary-traders and wholesale and retail 
traders. True, these issues are relevant not only in foreign trade but also concerning 
trade and enterprise networks inside a country. To sum up, the views of the GCC 
approach differ from standard economic trade theory and even challenge it in several 
ways.  
While studying the export performance and the value chain involved in it, GCC 
approach has been deeply connected to the (under-)development studies. True, the FSU 
countries are not traditionally regarded as developing countries. There are, however, 
similarities justifying the usage of the approach. In terms of market access, they 
encounter trade barriers in the most promising export markets and their negotiation 
power to ease market access is weak. The market access problem cannot be measured 
only by listing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers blocking the way of Ukrainian goods 
to the markets of European union, for instance. Instead, the description of the 
development of the Ukrainian agro-food sector presented below sheds light on the 
various difficulties and barriers that agents in the agro-food commodity chain have 
encountered. We must bear in mind that numerous crucial skills and forms of know-how 
were entirely lacking when the period of planned economy ended. The skills of 
operating in the market, how to acquire information, and whether all agents in the agro-
food sector are in equal position in terms of access to information became suddenly very 
important. Further, the know-how of marketing and price formation in the market 
economy were something that the agents of the agro-food commodity chain did not 
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have to think about during the period of planned economy. In that sense, the FSU 
countries, Ukraine among others, can be even in a worse position than developing 
countries, which have had experience of markets and perhaps even access to foreign 
markets. To compare, the FSU countries could not have had the experience of exporting 
agro-food goods. Agro-food goods were produced for the domestic market and 
consumed there.   
Several additional similarities can briefly be noted. First, the financial markets operate 
rather poorly both in developing countries and FSU countries. In addition, both group of 
countries are rather corrupted and they suffer from inadequate infrastructure and poorly 
defined property rights.  
For the purposes of this paper a brief review on the GCC approach suffice. Even a 
limited review demonstrates the fundamentals of the approach and enables us to 
construct a structured analysis of the agro-food sector of Ukraine. In addition, the 
analysis of Ukrainian agro-food sector will contribute to discussion on the GCC 
approach. The starting point of using the GCC approach in analyzing the Ukrainian 
agro-food sector is an understanding of the fundamentals of the global agro-food trade.  
There seems to be a consensus among the authors using the GCC approach about the 
fundamental characteristics of the world trade and the global commodity chains of the 
agro-food sector. Admittedly, there are significant differences between goods, but most 
authors among the GCC approach agree on the direction of the development and the 
changes taken place in the 1990s. The period when Ukraine has been trying to enter 
world markets has been a period of structural changes in the global agro-food markets. 
The nature of the agro-food sector has been transforming from a model based on family-
based production for local and national markets to a complex global agro-food system 
(Gibbon 2001b; Gwynne 1999).  
The agro-food sectors and individual agents within it have to determine what to 
produce, how much, for whom, where and by which technology. Previously, the 
questions have been answered and decisions made by farms and the entire commodity 
chain within one country and even in the local level. Decision-making in the national 
level and national organizations representing producers or regulating exports were able 
to shape the construction of the value chain and, what is more important, the distribution 
of income within the chain (Gibbon 2001; Gwynne 1999). The change towards the 
present forms of value chains took place in the 1990s. 
The decision-making process has been changing and the questions are increasingly 
answered by global food processing companies, international traders and, even more 
importantly, by large supermarkets accounting for tens of percents of retail sales in 
some particular goods. However, the imbalance in the GCC case studies may stress the 
chains governed by supermarkets unnecessarily (see Gibbon 2001a).     
The Ukrainian agriculture has not followed the path of the mainstream trends of the 
world agriculture, large farms having produced for the large Soviet market for decades 
in Ukraine. The issue that Ukrainian agro-food sector does have in common with other 
countries is the integration to the global agro-food systems. The integration Ukraine has 
been obliged to conduct has been quite sudden compared to many other countries 
having encountered more gradual integration and gradually changed environment.   
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The specificities of the change in the decision-making process – i.e. chain governance – 
in Ukraine will be analyzed more thoroughly later on but it seems to be clear that 
Ukraine has been going through a different transformation from different starting point 
but ending, however, to adapt to similar global operating environment as other countries 
with totally different starting points. 
In this brief review, a special emphasis is given to three issues. First, the central issue in 
the GCC is the dichotomy to producer-driven and buyer-driven chains. Second, the 
chain governance is of particular importance for agro-food sectors of the FSU countries. 
Third, the upgrading is reviewed to present the framework used to study Ukraine’s 
possibilities to improve its position in the value chain. 
2.2 Producer- and Buyer-Driven Dichotomy  
The major pattern of the GCC is the dichotomy to producer- and buyer-driven GCCs. 
The dichotomy was first presented by Gereffi (1994). The leading firms in both 
producer- and buyer-driven chains use various barriers to entry to generate different 
kinds of rents. The producer-driven commodity chains are those in which large, usually 
transnational manufacturers play central roles in coordinating production networks, 
including their forward and backward linkages. They are characteristically capital and 
technology-intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, computers, semi-
conductors and heavy machinery (Gereffi 1999). The required capital investments to 
enter sectors are huge and, as a result, barriers to entry are high. The profits are derived 
from scale, volume and technological advantages. The chains usually rely on 
technology rents which are rooted in asymmetrical access to key process technologies 
requiring huge investments. From the point of view of chain governance, chains are 
governed by the industrial firms at the point of production (Figure 2.2.1). The agro-food 
value chains are considered to be buyer-driven and, therefore, we leave the producer-
driven chains aside and concentrate on the buyer-driven ones.  
 
Figure 2.2.1. The producer-driven commodity chain (Gereffi 1999). 
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Figure 2.2.2. The buyer-driven GCC (Gereffi 1999). 
 
The buyer-driven GCCs differ, first of all, from producer-driven chains in that they have 
low barriers of entry in production. Apparel industries are the textbook case of buyer 
driven industries (Gereffi 1999). Producers are subordinated to the agents controlling 
design and marketing and, in particular, the international brands and retailing, where 
barriers to entry are high and profits concentrated. To create an international brand is a 
huge investment but production itself does not require large investments.  
Production is increasingly out-sourced, the overwhelming majority of the sub-
contractors being located in developing countries. A paper by Kalantaridis et al. 
demonstrates the position of the textile industry of a Ukrainian region – Transcarpathia 
– in the buyer-driven commodity chain (Kalantaridis et al. 2003).  
Because the barriers to entry to production are low, there must be different assets 
generating the rents. Relational rents refer to different kinds of inter-firm relations 
including supply-chain management linking assemblers with input suppliers (small and 
medium sized enterprises), organizational forms of alliances and clustering. In addition, 
trade policy rents refer to value created by trade policy measures and, finally, brand 
name rents refer the profits from the product differentiation techniques based on 
established brands.  
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Figure 2.2.3. Buyer-driven GCC in agro-food sector. 
In the case studies using the GCC approach, the access to the largest flows of goods to 
retailing – i.e. supermarkets – has increasingly dictated the success of agriculture and 
the entire commodity chain. This is, of course, a situation, where the value chain can 
easily be regarded as a buyer driven. Establishing production does not require 
investments comparable to the traditionally producer driven sectors. To start production 
either in agriculture or food processing or distribution does not require particularly large 
investments. In the same way, the required technology does not differ substantially 
between competing agro-food value chains. True, the volume of production may be 
essential in succeeding in competition. The importance of brands is huge in some of the 
agro-food goods and creating them is extremely costly.  
It has been argued (Dolan & Tewari 2001) that within a chain the buyer is likely to exert 
power in following occasions and, consequently, a buyer driven chain occurs. First, the 
gap between market requirements and producer capabilities is high. Quality is by far not 
the only variable in which requirements can exceed the ability of supplier to meet the 
requirements. JIT (just-in-time) management technologies require flexibility and 
specific know-how. Reliability and product variety also typify market requirements, 
which are not easily met by suppliers. Second, the buyer-driven chain is likely to 
appear, to cite Dolan and Tewari (2001), where there is a wide gap between the 
knowledge required for production for the domestic market compared to what is 
required for the export market. Third, again citing Dolan and Tewari, where there are 
significant risks to buyers of poor supplier performance. Consumers or officials may set 
standards for the entire commodity chain and operating according to the standards may 
well require intense chain governance. Apparently, only the second argument includes 
an assumption that the chain is at some stage a cross-border one.   
To conclude, the present understanding about the factors resulting in buyer-driven 
chains seems to be rooted to a large extent in asymmetrical availability of information 
about the requirements of markets as well as standards and rules faced by the agents 
operating in the retail markets. The changes in consuming patterns and, consequently, 
sudden changes in demand for agro-food goods mean that the information what to 
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produce is the decisive factor, more important than price. The efficiency of the supply 
chain, however, also requires chain governance.  
Gibbon has made some valuable comments on the buyer driven chains (Gibbon 2001a). 
He notes that most of the studies on which the buyer-driven approach has been 
established, have explored rather special case of trade in agro-food goods, i.e. 
horticulture exports to UK (Dolan & Humphrey 2000, Gwynne 1999, Kaplan & 
Kaplinsky 1999)(Figure 2.2.3.). True, there are other studies as well as but their scope 
does not substantially differ from the referred group of studies (Fitter & Kaplinsky 
2001). Gibbon asks whether the results can be generalized to represent, first, the trade in 
agro-food goods between developing and developed countries and, second, the logic of 
the buyer driven approach. This paper seeks also to contribute to that debate seeking to 
answer yet one more question: can the basic idea of buyer/producer driven dichotomy 
and chain governance assist us in explaining the development Ukrainian agro-food 
sector, and not only concerning its exports but the development of its agro-food sector 
in general.  
Gibbon questions whether the concepts central to the entire buyer driven approach are 
valid if the buyer is not retailer or merchandiser or other brand-holder. The international 
markets of traditional agro-food goods differ markedly from the markets of horticulture 
goods. Typically, these goods are easily perishable and they are rarely processed. He 
lists some characteristics making difference between international traders (but not 
retailers/brand holders) and retailers usually typified by UK supermarkets. The chains 
driven or governed by the international traders are more loosely governed. Gibbon 
refers to Cramer’s study on cashew nut production in Mozambique and argues that what 
is missing in Cramer’s paper is “the glue that binds these elements (agents of the chain. 
A.H.) together, namely an account of the chain’s coordinating agents, its forms of 
coordination and the historical dynamic which this embodies.” Cramer simply stresses 
the absence of MNCs and that a free market exists in the chain. Gibbon argues that the 
main reason for the construction of the loosely governed cashew nut GCC is that 
international traders drive the chain. He argues that several international commodity 
chains are predominantly driven by international traders. True, the characteristics of the 
markets of agro-food goods traded by international traders vary.  
According to Gibbon, international trader driven chains are most likely to be found with 
two or more of the following characteristics. First, if the commodities are of relatively 
low value-to-weight ratio, with labor-intensive direct raw-material production functions 
and with otherwise low barriers of entry. Second, in case the supply is dispersed 
globally and locally discontinuous. This means that availability varies annually and 
seasonally and only international traders can meet the supply requirements. Third, if 
there is a strong tendency to market saturation caused by a combination of partial 
substitution by “new” agricultural or manufactured products. Also, saturation can be 
rooted in new suppliers and low price-elasticity of demand. Forth, if final demand side 
is either dispersed or concentrated but segmented with respect to product variety. No 
individual supplier can meet the requirements of the market in terms of being able to 
procure continuously specific volumes and quality mixes for number of processors. The 
critical entry barriers to trading functions include high amount of working capital and 
accumulated market knowledge. The high amount of working capital is required to be 
able to trade in large volumes. The accumulated market knowledge includes the 
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knowledge about market-related services like transport, insurance and financial 
services. Gibbon also lists intangibles like reputation among the critical entry barriers 
(Gibbon 2001a). The main source of profitability is large volume rather than high 
margins.  
Raikes et al. have also raised some questions and made valuable comments about the 
dichotomy (Raikes et al. 2000). First, are the commodity chains strictly either producer- 
or buyer driven? Further, is there really only one driver dictating the rules of the game 
for the others? These questions are not a problem if we regard the dichotomy only as a 
starting point for constructing a framework for analyzing the agro-food sector in 
Ukraine.  
Instead of talking about either producer or buyer-driven chains, we could perhaps talk 
about buyer or producer dominated chains confessing that the distribution of power is 
not “all or nothing” but, instead, the power could be unevenly distributed and the 
uneven distribution can be explained by the unevenly distributed assets. In addition, the 
distribution of assets and, consequently, power within the chain is certainly not static, 
but can change over time. These issues will be discussed later on when we focus on 
Ukraine. However, even the relatively strict and simplified distinction between 
producer- and buyer-driven GCCs is a useful and valuable starting point in analyzing 
the agro-food sector of Ukraine bearing in mind the comments made by Gibbon (2001a) 
and Raikes et al.(2000).  
2.3 Chain Governance 
Gereffi indentifies four dimensions of the GCCs: their input-output structure, the 
territory covered, their governance structures, and the institutional framework through 
which national and international policies and conditions shape the globalization process 
at each stage of the chain (Gereffi 1999). The input-output structure and the 
geographical coverage of the GCCs have been used mainly descriptively to outline the 
configuration of specific chains. Raikes et al (2000) argue that the governance structure 
has so far reached the most attention since this is where the key notions of barriers to 
entry and chain co-operation appear in the analytical framework, and where the 
distinction between the producer-driven and buyer-driven GCC governance structures 
has been introduced.   
Governance within the chain refers to the key actors of the chain that determine the 
inter-firm division of labor and shape the capacities of participants to upgrade their 
activities.  Why is governance required in the first place? First, the competitive strategy 
of the firms operating in the retail sales market in developed countries can be based on – 
apart from price – liability, product variety, quality and speed of innovation. The 
strategy requires supply chain management to ensure that those factors on which the 
competitiveness is based on are preserved and ensured. As was argued earlier, the 
success of buyer-driven is based on organizations of the value chain rather than on the 
investments in production, i.e. relational rents.  
Second, chain governance may include the monitoring of quality and, often, measures to 
ensure that the quality requirements are fulfilled. In other words, the chain governance 
is often connected to inadequacies in same part of the chain. For example, some agent 
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involved in the chain can be incompetent to meet the quality requirements or they may 
have insufficient knowledge about the requirements of markets.  
Both Dolan & Humphrey (2000) and Gwynne (1999; see also Kaplan & Kaplinsky 
1999) have stressed the increased dominance of large supermarkets in the UK and in the 
US (Gereffi 1994) in the food retailing and, as a result, in the commodity chains 
connecting farmers in the developing countries to retail sales of developed countries. 
The competitive strategies of supermarkets are based not only on price but also on 
quality, consistency and the reliability of supply, product variety, processing, packaging 
etc. These requirements set norms for the primary producers of goods to be met. Apart 
from food quality requirements, there is an increasing trend towards labor and 
environmental standards that the entire commodity chain should honor. These cannot be 
met without chain governance. 
The high degree of control is easiest to exercise when there is a power asymmetry 
between supermarkets and suppliers.  Meeting the requirements set by the retailers is 
easier for large exporters. The need to develop post-harvest facilities and JIT 
management techniques also favors larger units because smaller enterprises are unlikely 
to be able to make the necessary investments and to carry the financial burden of the 
innovation and promotion of new goods. Again, we should bear in mind Gibbon’s 
critique towards buyer-driven dichotomy. There are numerous agro-food goods in 
which the competition is based on price. 
The concentration of activities in the commodity chain into larger units holds also for 
the primary producers. Exporters favor large farms in acquiring goods. They have also 
taken some farms under their control by acquiring land, for example. By doing so, they 
have prepared to respond flexibly to the requirements set by exporters. There are 
exceptions to the rule (Dolan & Humphrey 2000), but in general the GCCs tend to favor 
large farms.  
There is evidence about local agro-food systems producing and processing mainly for 
local, regional and national markets that in terms of chain governance seem to differ 
from those orientating to global markets. They concentrate, however, on goods where 
national consuming habits prevail or which for some other reasons have maintained 
their regional or national character (Requier-Desjardins et al. 2003).  
Some concluding remarks about agro-food commodity chains and their governance can 
be done. One must bear in mind that these remarks are based on limited number of case 
studies and, as Gibbon noted, is under question whether the these assumptions can be 
generalized. The competition in the retail sales market drives the supermarkets to be 
innovative in offering goods. High requirements for quality necessitate the strict control 
and governance of the chain. Also, competition between the retailers and in every part 
of the chain makes them to compete. Although the price is not argued to be the most 
important factor in competition between supermarkets, at least in the case of 
horticultural goods, both large primary producers and exporters seem to be in the best 
position both concerning liability, quality and price. The specific needs of consumers 
and limited access to this information dictates the chain governance, the retailers having 
superior access to this information.  
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2.4 Upgrading 
Even though the GCC approach has been criticized for being pessimistic and giving 
only little hope for developing countries’ (DC) possibilities to upgrade, the 
argumentation running counter to criticism has stressed that the GCC, on the contrary, 
offers an approach which is focusing on individual value chains and the possibilities of 
DC firms to upgrade instead of analyzing the possibilities of DC on a more general 
level. The upgrading has been studied on the industry level and the level of individual 
value chain mostly concerning textiles. There are some studies exploring the 
possibilities of upgrading in the agro-food sector as well and this paper focuses, of 
course, on them.  
In Gereffis argumentation (Gereffi 1999),  
“industrial upgrading is a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy 
to move to more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital- and skill-
intensive economic niches. Industrial upgrading operates at several different levels 
of analysis. First, within factories when upgrading involves moving from cheap to 
expensive items, from simple to complex, and from small to large orders. Second, 
within inter-firm enterprise networks when upgrading involves a shift from mass 
production of standardized goods to flexible production of differentiated goods. 
Third, within local or national economies when it involves moving from simple 
assembly of imported inputs to more integrated forms of OEM and OBM 
production, including a greater use of forward and backward linkages at the local 
or national level. Fourth, within regions when it involves shifting from bilateral, 
asymmetrical, inter-regional trade flows to a more fully developed intra-regional 
division of labor incorporating all phases of the commodity chain from raw 
material supply, through production, distribution, and consumption.”  
Industrial upgrading involves organizational learning to improve the position of firms 
(and farms) and nations in international trade networks. Gereffi argues that  
 “Participation in global commodity chains is a necessary step for industrial 
upgrading because it puts firms and economies on potentially dynamic learning 
curves. We need to address not only why industrial upgrading occurs in the 
GCCs but also how it occurs. A commodity chains framework that attempts to 
link international trade and industrial upgrading must specify: the mechanisms 
by which organizational learning occurs in trade networks; typical trajectories 
among export roles; and the organizational conditions that facilitate industrial 
upgrading moves such as the shift from assembly to full-package networks.” 
Gereffi’s works study apparel industry. Analyses on primary commodities like agro-
food goods have gained less attention in his studies. The micro foundations of the 
upgrading pattern involve both forward and backward linkages from production and, in 
particular, the learning that occurs across the segments. Gereffi stresses the importance 
of information available within the chain.  
Because this paper is interested in agro-food sector, a brief review of studies of 
upgrading in the agro-food sector will follow. Kaplan and Kaplinsky (1999) have 
studied the deciduous fruit canning industry in South Africa. The competitive 
environment they face looks briefly as follows. South African producers are low-cost 
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and high-quality producers that dominated the world market in the 1970s. Their position 
worsened in the 1980s and early 1990s, mainly because European producers boosted 
their production. The European union pays significant subsidizes to (mostly Greek and 
Spanish) producers. In 1997, RSA ceased to subsidize production and the canning 
industry appeared to be in crisis. Both in US and Europe, South African exports face 
tariff protection favoring domestic producers. In addition, the exports from RSA are 
hampered by cross-subsidized exports from EU in third country markets.    
Kaplan and Kaplinsky have listed several options for the South African producers to 
upgrade production and to improve their position. First, they can to introduce new 
value-added products. It requires the resources to do marketing and to take risk of 
innovating new products. The issue of introducing new products was referred to in other 
studies and noted that it requires investments and includes risks. In that case, there are 
only limited opportunities to launch new products.   
Second option is to improve competitiveness and efficiency in the entire value-chain. 
The authors make evident how difficult it has been to improve competitiveness by, for 
example, introducing better value chain co-ordination, i.e. to create relational rents. 
Third option is to move up the value-chain. South African producers have, for example, 
tried to extend their activities to retailing by acquiring a well-known brand, though the 
most important markets excluded, i.e. to create brand name rents. To move up by value 
chain has not been successful either. To conclude, the main underlying reason for the 
unfavorable position of South African producers are, first of all, the subsidizes paid to 
European producers. In addition, the ability of the value chain to adapt to strengthened 
competition by co-coordinating value chain domestically have not succeeded. Neither 
have the other options to upgrade.   
In the study of Dolan and Humphrey (2000), the appeared upgrading opportunities arise 
from the re-positioning of fresh vegetables chain by the supermarket. Consuming trends 
stress product diversification and extensive processing, which, in turn, offers 
possibilities for upgrading for able farms. There is, however, more and more 
competition among the producers of horticultural goods.  
And what does upgrading require? Instead of simply lowering costs, diversification of 
assortment, innovation and producing more value-added are required. A move into new 
functional areas in the production chain where to control a more complex bundle of 
activities, expanding backwards and expanding forwards are required. In the case of 
apparel industry, to quote Dolan and Tewari, expanding backwards has meant that some 
firms have created backward linkages to gain control over yarn variety and quality. 
Controlling product consistency and assuring timely input drives suppliers to control 
backward linkages. More common form of upgrading is expanding forward linkages of 
the chain, often to higher value added stages of production. Gaining control over 
logistics is one possible way of upgrading. The importance of logistics has increased 
and it is often one of the core competences in the chain. Expanding overseas by buying, 
for example, marketing and distribution channels to ensure market access are also 
possible ways to upgrade.  
Apparently, different goods offer different possibilities for upgrading and upgrading is 
to a large extent dependent on the nature of the produce. In the case of horticulture 
goods, only limited processing is possible. On
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goods, which must be processed, but as far as the studies on buyer driven chains have 
focused on horticulture, the preconditions for upgrading by establishing processing have 
not been studied adequately. Other factors have their impact on upgrading. First, the 
stages of the chain requiring the largest investments differ. Second, the state 
involvement is different in different sectors.  
As the above presented demonstrates, to do a complete description of upgrading is 
extremely difficult task because the conditions vary between sectors and, in particular, 
various institutional environments. To cite Dolan and Tewari, “[L]ocal practices, 
political arrangements, physical and human resources, infrastructure, extra-chain 
investment decisions and larger business environment all affect the capacity and desire 
of firms involved in value chains to upgrade” (Dolan & Tewari 2001). They consider 
whether there could be common features having facilitated the upgrading process. 
Upgrading is more likely to occur in quality than price-driven chains. Quality, reliability 
and product variety require chain governance. On the other hand, they also provide 
opportunity to able firms to upgrade.  
2.5 Conclusions 
The empirical foundation of the GCC approach is mostly based on apparel and agro-
food goods but the amount of case studies is limited which is not to say that those 
studies are not sound. They, however, focus on a few goods and, what is more 
important, rather similar goods. Because the focus of this study is on agro-food goods, 
the concluding remarks deal with studies on agro-food sector. The studies cited most 
often focus on the horticulture exports from developing countries to the shelves of 
supermarkets in developed countries (Dolan & Humphrey 2000; Gwynne 1999; Kaplan 
& Kaplinsky 1999). The chain is buyer-driven, because the retailer has the critical 
information about the requirements of the markets. And the chain governance is 
required because quality requirements cannot be met without it. Because of the 
asymmetrical information, the retailers can dictate the rules of the game. These studies 
also demonstrate the poor ability of developing countries to upgrade (Kaplan & 
Kaplinsky 1999). The competitiveness at these markets is predominantly based on 
quality, not price. 
Although the case studies have considered the agro-food sector as buyer-driven 
category, some critical remarks deserve attention. First, Gibbon argues that the 
conclusions made on the basis of the above mentioned case studies cannot be 
generalized to explain the international trade of agro-food goods. Instead, he stresses 
that a substantial part – if not the majority – of the trade can be regarded as international 
trader driven. Their ability to govern the chain is based on access to capital, large 
quantities traded and accumulated knowledge about markets. The competitiveness at 
these markets is predominantly based on price, not quality. We should also bear in mind 
the arguments Raikes presents. He argues that the dichotomy is too strict. Still, we can 
use the dichotomy as a starting point.    
The buyer driven approach, however, includes some assumptions on the nature of 
economic interaction and agents that may not take into consideration certain 
specificities of the economy of the FSU countries. First, it clearly assumes that all the 
levels of chain have at least a basic understanding of how markets function. Second, it 
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assumes that there is certain experience of foreign trade and, in particular, export in the 
agro-food sector. Third, the very common phenomenon in Ukraine – barter trade – is 
non-existent in studies reviewed. These may necessitate an extension in the producer-
driven/buyer-driven dichotomy.  
One can argue that neither producer nor buyer driven approaches are exclusively for 
foreign trade. So far there has been virtually nothing in the approaches that is based on 
cross-border activities. True, a substantial share of the enterprise networks are 
international and contribute to international trade, but that does not mean that the 
approach used to study them can not be used to study development in one country. 
Another concept used in the following sections is the chain governance. Some key 
issues deserve particular attention in studying Ukraine. Dolan and Tewari identified the 
most common cases in which chain governance is needed and only one of them – if the 
requirements between domestic and foreign differ substantially – includes the foreign 
trade aspect. The others can hold for development within one country. For the purposes 
of this study, one remark on this point is necessary. Market can be very different also 
within one country and requirements can vary in different markets in one country as 
well. One of the aims of the study is to study this point more thoroughly; whether the 
GCC approach can be used to study the development of the Ukrainian agro-food sector 
both concerning its export-oriented and domestic market oriented value-chains.   
Third concept to be used in the following sections is upgrading. To put it briefly, 
upgrading requires investments and flexibility to quickly adapt to changes in the market.   
I argue that the fact that the commodity chains studied have been cross border ones 
often connecting developing and developed countries, does not mean that similar 
patterns do not exist in commodity chains within a country or between two similar 
countries, in that case Ukraine and Russia. The FSU countries are, however, in several 
terms different from developing countries. It means that the following sections will test 
to what extent the GCC approach can shed light on the development of the agro-food 
sector and whether the GCC approach needs to be improved or extended to analyze the 
development.  
3 The Development of the Agro-Food Sector in the 1990s  
3.1 Agriculture, Food-Processing Industry and Food Market  
Because the purpose of the study is not a general analysis of the Ukrainian agriculture 
but, instead, an effort to apply the GCC approach on separate value-chains of the 
Ukrainian agro-food sector, a brief review on the development of agriculture in general 
will suffice. After that, we focus on the food processing industry. To conclude the 
overall development of the agro-food sector, we then analyze the dynamics of the agro-
food value chain in general. The next section investigates four value chains and 
provides a more in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the value chain and, in particular, 
seeks to contribute to discussion within the GCC approach.  
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Table 3.1.1. Total agricultural production, the production of large farms and the 
production of individual farms 1990-2000 (1990=100) (Derzhkomstat 2001c). 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total 
agricultural 
production 
100 87 80 81 67 65 59 58 52 48 53 
Production of 
large farms 
100 83 68 67 53 48 38 37 31 28 26 
Production of 
individual farms 
100 97 107 114 102 105 108 108 103 97 117 
 
 
3.1.1 Agriculture  
Agriculture was hit hard in the 1990s and production decreased substantially. Compared 
to 1990, the value of agricultural production was 53 % in 2000. Apart from substantial 
decrease, several structural changes have taken place. The large farms accounted for 71 
% of the agricultural production in 1990, the proportion of household plots being 29 %. 
Perhaps the most dramatic change in the agro-food sector in the 1990s has been the 
increased share of household plots in the total production. The share of the large farms 
in total production decreased steadily in the 1990s and was only 35 % in 2000. The 
value of their production in 2000 was only 26 % compared to production in 1990. 
However, they still account for the bulk of the production in grain, sunflower and sugar 
beet. The production at household plots has fluctuated but increased slightly in the 
1990s. The increased share of production at individual farms (65 %) has meant, in other 
words, that the agricultural production has fragmented.   
Another important shift in agricultural production has been the diminished share of 
livestock production in total production. Livestock production accounted for 50 % of 
the total agricultural production in 1990 but its proportion has decreased since then. It 
accounted for 40 % of the total agricultural production in 2000.  
The increased proportion of crop production is demonstrated even better if we focus on 
large farms. The share of crop production in the total production of large farms was 53 
% in 1990 but increased to 70 % in 2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c). The shift from the 
fifty-fifty structure to a structure dominated by crop production, especially at large 
farms, can be considered as a positive change because it indicates the shift from loss-
making production to more efficient forms.   
Meat and dairy 
In agriculture the livestock production of large farms suffered the worst, with 
production levels shrinking to about one fifth. Large farms accounted for 66 % of 
livestock production in 1990, household plots accounting for the remaining 34 %. In 
2000, however, the proportion of livestock production of large farms was 32 % and 
household plots accounted for 68 %. 
During the Soviet time, most of the animals were on the large farms. They accounted 
for 86 % of the cattle, 74 % of cows and 72 % pigs in 1990. At the same time, the 
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household plots accounted for 14 % of cattle, 26 % of cows and 18 % pigs. The amount 
of animals decreased substantially at the large farms in the 1990s while the amount of 
animals – apart from pigs – increased at household plots. Consequently, the proportion 
of animals at household plots increased. They accounted for 47 % of cattle, 63 % of 
cows and 68 % of pigs, the proportions at large farms being respectively 53 %, 37 % 
and 32 % in 2000.  
The reasons for the fragmentation of livestock production are numerous. The reasons 
are rooted in the decreased purchasing power and poor competitiveness of large farms’ 
livestock production and, in particular, decreased state support. It proved for one of the 
most unprofitable parts of agriculture during the 1990s. Due to inadequate income to 
farms, they have been unable to pay salaries in cash. Instead, cattle have been delivered 
to workers instead of salary. In addition, the prices of critical inputs rose. True, the poor 
performance of the livestock sector is also rooted in the inefficiency of the meat 
processing industry that has succeeded only modestly in competing in the retail sales 
market.  
Crops 
Compared to the livestock sector, crop production has performed better. The crop 
production as a whole decreased by approximately one third during the 1990s. The 
proportion of large farms in total crop production remained quite high. There have been, 
however, significant differences between goods. The most important cash crops: grain, 
sunflower and sugar beet are mostly grown at large farms. In 2000, the shares produced 
at large farms were 82 %, 88 % and 88 % respectively. These goods will be dealt more 
thoroughly in the next section. Potatoes and vegetables are mostly produced at 
household plots, 99 % and 83 % respectively.  
 
3.1.2 Food industry and food market 
The table below demonstrates the decline in the production of food industry in the 
1990s. The production of all goods has decreased. The production has decreased most in 
meat and milk. There are several goods in which the production is still more than half of 
the level in 1990: sunflower oil, margarine, confectioneries and chocolate. The 
sunflower oil has performed by far the best with a production of more than 90 % 
compared to 1990. There has been an increase in several goods either in 1999 or 2000, 
sausages, butter and cheese, tinned goods, confectioneries and chocolate demonstrating 
this recovery. Obviously, these goods have superseded imports after the devaluation of 
Ukrainian currency when the prices of imported food increased.  
It is also easy to notice that the official per capita production volumes in the food 
processing industry are very low. For example, the production of milk is only about 14 
kilos (liters) per capita and the volumes of production of meat (8.1 kilos) and sausages 
(3.5 kilos) are also extremely low.   
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Table 3.1.2. The volume of production in food industry (thousands of tones) 1990, 
1995-1996, 1998-2000, production per capita in 2000 (kilos) and production in 2000 
compared to 1990 (1990=100) (Derzhkomstat 2001a).   
 1990 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 Production 
per capita, 
2000, 
kilos 
Production 
in 2000 
compared 
to 1990 
Sugar 6791 3894 3296 1984 1858 1800 36.4 26.5 
Meat 2763 957 760 396 420 400 8.1 14.5 
Sausages 900 277 213 155 160 176 3.5 20.0 
Butter 444 222 163 113 108 135 2.7 30.4 
Milk 6432 1293 915 691 700 699 14.1 10.9 
Cheese 184 74 59 52 53 67 1.4 36.4 
Vegetable oil 1070 696 705 511 577 972 19.6 90.8 
Margarine 289 109 89 97 120 161 3.3 55.7 
Tinned goods 4836 1444 1014 1118 1186 1283 25.9 26.5 
Flour 7671 5319 4965 3890 3354 n.a. 62.0 43.7* 
Cereals 962 532 456 409 342 293 5.9 30.5 
Bread 6701 4114 3452 2676 2505 2461 49.7 36.7 
Confectioneries 1111 315 283 401 515 667 13.5 60.0 
of which 
chocolate 
675 185 180 255 327 431 n.a. 63.9* 
Pasta 360 223 172 165 154 116 2.3 32.2 
*=production in 1999 compared to 1990 
 
There is, however, a significant difference between the amount of food produced in the 
food processing industry and the food consumed (see Table 3.1.3). To explain the 
decreased production in the processing industry, it is fruitful to investigate the pattern of 
food consumption and, in particular, the differences between them. The table below 
demonstrates that the food consumption has not decreased as much as the production in 
the industry. The consumption of nearly all goods presented in the table has decreased. 
For example, the table demonstrates that the meat consumption in 2000 is less than one 
third compared to 1990. It is a marked decrease but the amount consumed is still much 
more than the production of meat in the food processing industry. True, some meat has 
been imported (see Table 3.1.5) but it explains only partly the difference between 
domestic production and consumption.  
Although the overall trend in consumption has been a decrease there are goods in which 
the consumption has either decreased a little or remained the same, potatoes and 
vegetables typifying this. In addition, the consumption of bread, pasta and cereals has 
not decreased as much as other goods. There are obvious explanations for the changed 
patterns. The consumption of the cheapest foodstuff has not decreased whereas the 
consumption of the more expensive goods has decreased more. Processed meat and 
milk have been especially hard hit by this trend.  
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Table 3.1.3. The per capita consumption (kilos) of major foodstuffs in Ukraine in 1990, 
1995-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001a).  
 
 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Meat and meat products 68 39 37 35 33 33 32 
Milk and milk products 373 244 230 210 213 210 198 
Eggs 272 171 161 151 154 163 163 
Fish 18 4 4 5 6 7 8 
Sugar 50 32 33 31 32 33 34 
Vegetable oil 12 8 9 8 8 9 9 
Potatoes 131 124 128 134 129 122 133 
Vegetables 102 97 92 91 94 96 101 
Fruits, berries and grapes 47 33 35 40 28 22 30 
Bread, cereals and pasta 141 128 124 127 126 122 123 
 
The following table tells virtually the same story as the table above. It demonstrates the 
volume of retail sales and the proportion of food in overall retail sales.  In addition, the 
table demonstrates the proportions of various foodstuffs in total food retail sales. The 
table demonstrates that the proportion of food in the overall retail sales decreased 
towards the end of the 1990s, a trend indicating a slight increase in living standard and 
purchasing power. The five major goods acquired at retail market are meat and meat 
products, oil, confectioneries, bread and bakery and the others, which includes, for 
example, spirits and beverages. It is very important to note the low value of per capita 
food retail sales (109 USD/year). True, this figure obviously does not take into account 
(at least all) the sales at market places and is unreliable even concerning other retail 
outlets.  
Table 3.1.5 demonstrates the pattern of food imports in 1996–1999. The per capita value 
of food imports was 18 USD in 1999. At the same time, the per capita food retail sales 
were 59 USD. In other words, the value of food imports was quite substantial in total 
food retail sales. We also notice, however, that in food imports certain goods dominate. 
We see that cigarettes and meat and meat products are the most important goods 
imported. The value of meat imports is 2 USD per capita and, at the same time, the 
value of meat retail sales per capita is 7.3 USD. Although the proportion of food 
imports can be considered substantial, it does not explain the difference between the 
domestic production of food processing industry and consumption. 
We can conclude the message of the four tables presented here by saying that official 
volume of food retail sales is very low. Similarly, the production of food industry 
decreased markedly in the 1990s and the per capita production is also very low. The 
food consumption has not, however, decreased that much and import cannot explain the 
difference. It means that there are a lot of goods entering the consumption unprocessed 
and that the importance of household plots is extremely important in the food supply 
and consumption. In other words, we are sure to misunderstand the development of the 
agro-food sector if we focus only on the value chain consisting of large farms, food 
processing industry and retail market.  
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Table 3.1.4. The volume of the retail market sales (million USD), the proportion of 
foodstuffs in total retail sales (million USD) and the distribution of food retail sales by 
goods and the value of per capita sales by goods in 1999 (Derzhkomstat 2001a) (top 
five groups bolded). 
 
 1995 1995 
 
1998 1998 1999 1999 USD 
per 
capita 
Value of retail sales 8139 100 
% 
7884 100 
% 
5363 100 % 109 
Of which food 5134 63 4627 59 2917 54 59 
Meat and meat 
products, of which 
815 15.9 606 13.1 356 12.2 7.3 
-meat 286 -5.6 224 -4.8 129 -4.4 2.2 
-sausages 496 -9.7 361 -7.8 216 -7.3 4.3 
-canned meat 20 -0.6 21 -0.4 11 -0.4 0.2 
Fish and fish products 167 3.2 163 3.5 47 1.6 0.9 
Canned fruit and 
vegetables  
81 1.6 56 1.2 35 1.2 0.7 
Oil/fat 325 6.3 207 4.5 126 4.3 2.7 
-animal fat  200 -3.9 86 -1.9 54 -1.9 1.1 
-vegetable oil 48 -0.9 51 -1.1 31 -1.1 0.6 
-others 78 -1.5 70 -1.5 41 -1.4 0.8 
Milk and milk products 239 4.7 173 3.7 126 4.1 2.4 
Cheese 80 1.5 58 1.3 34 1.2 0.7 
Eggs 93 1.8 68 1.5 46 1.6 0.9 
Sugar 178 3.5 93 2.0 53 1.8 1.1 
Confectioneries 381 7.4 422 9.1 253 8.7 5.1 
Tea and coffee 41 0.8 56 1.2 42 1.4 0.8 
Bread and bakery 905 17.6 665 14.4 354 12.1 7.3 
Flour 81 1.6 82 1.8 46 1.6 0.9 
Pasta 79 1.5 54 1.2 31 1.1 0.6 
Cereals 84 1.6 65 1.4 37 1.3 0.8 
Potato and vegetables 167 3.3 85 1.8 53 1.8 1.1 
Fruits and berries 71 1.4 50 1.1 28 1.0 0.6 
Others  1348 26.2 1724 37.3 1214 41.6 25 
 
The structures of the entire agro-food sector and the agro-food value chain have 
changed so fundamentally that a more detailed analysis is required to take into account 
the various channels of goods supplying consumers with food. Figure 3.1.1 
demonstrates the structures of the food market. The bolded arrows demonstrate the 
flows of goods which have become more important in supplying the consumption.  
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Table 3.1.5. The total food imports to Ukraine 1996-1999 and the value of the eight 
most important goods (million USD). (In brackets customs codes) (Agroperspektiva 
2001a).   
 1996 1997 1998 1999 Import per 
capita 1999, 
USD 
Cigarettes (24) 150 175 206 152 3.1 
Meat and meat products (2) 151 84 68 99 2.0 
Fish (3) 117 80 130 74 1.5 
Vegetable oil and animal fat (15) 37 40 94 76 1.5 
Sugar and confectioneries (17) 307 16 43 70 1.4 
Other food products (21) 108 56 41 69 1.4 
Cocoa and cocoa products (18) 56 73 83 61 1.2 
Fruits and nuts (8) 80 40 39 60 1.2 
Other  366 320 348 241 4.9 
Total import  1372 884 1052 902 18.3 
 
The second half of the section focuses on the adaptation of the agro-food value chain. 
What have been especially important for the adaptation are the diminished volume of 
retail sales and the division of retail market into processed and unprocessed goods. A 
significant amount of food sold at the retail market is unprocessed. This holds especially 
for milk and meat. The possibilities of the agents of the chain to adapt have differed and 
the following part of the section reviews the preconditions for the adaptation.  
3.2 The Agro-Food Sector in Ukraine in the 1990s:  Introducing the GCC 
Approach  
From the brief description presented above, it is quite easy to recognize the main 
changes of the sector and, consequently, the main challenges that the agro-food sector 
faced. The fundamentally changed operating environment in every level of the chain – 
agriculture, processing industry and food market – stresses the importance of adaptation 
by the entire value chain with a special emphasis on the structures connecting the 
separate parts of the chain. Before analyzing the chain it is necessary to briefly review 
some factors having impact on the possibilities of separate parts to adapt and, perhaps, 
to become the one who is governing the chain.    
3.2.1 The Soviet heritage:  A plan-driven commodity chain 
In terms of the GCC approach the Soviet system of agro-food sector is rather difficult to 
fit into the producer/buyer driven dichotomy. Obviously, the dichotomy developed to 
analyze market economies and, in particular, foreign trade cannot be expected to fit into 
totally different economic system. However, as far as the agro-food system faced a 
transition to market economy in the 1990s and this study seeks to explore its 
development within the framework the GCC approach, an effort to briefly describe the 
starting point using the same framework is grounded.  
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Figure 3.1.1 The changed structure of supplying food consumption in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 3.1.2. The agro-food value chain, food market and chain governance during the 
Soviet time.  
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If in the case of the buyer-driven GCC the decisive factor in shaping the strategy of 
supermarkets and other retailers are consumers’ preferences, they had a negligible 
impact on the functioning of the agro-food chain in the Soviet Union. Large farms and 
even the food-processing enterprises had a very limited power to make decisions 
concerning what to produce and to whom deliver goods. Outlines and priorities were set 
from outside the chain. The enterprise and farm level plans and production tasks to be 
fulfilled were not set by the farms and enterprises themselves but, instead, by the 
planning organizations.  
The position of large farms in Soviet agriculture was moderately good and stabile. They 
received annually large amounts of inputs (pesticides, fertilizers and machinery) and 
were financed on a stabile bases. What is important for the livestock sector, imported 
grain was used as a cheap fodder.  
What is important when comparing the present position of farms is that there was a 
guaranteed demand for their produce. Everything produced was needed and consumers 
were competing for the food produced. Further, there was no competition among farms. 
Or if there was competition, they were rather competing for inputs. The same holds for 
the processing industry. If there existed a competition among them, it was rather for raw 
materials. Similarly, consumers were competing for the food produced.   
Large farms mostly delivered their produce to processing industry and there were very 
few alternative channels available. There is, however, evidence suggesting that other 
channels would have been better, had the farms have an opportunity to choose. 
Household plots accounted for 29 % of agricultural production in Ukraine in 1990. They 
had alternative delivery channels available and they used them, mainly sales at market 
places where the prices were dictated by supply and demand. Also, a substantial share 
of household plots’ production was consumed by the owners of the plots or their 
families and relatives. 
3.2.2 The value chain in the 1990s  
Compared to Soviet period, several fundamental structural changes having impact on 
agro-food value chain took place. First, food market opened up for competition and 
even the domestic agro-food chain and its separate agents were forced to learn how to 
operate in the market. Second, the structures of the food market changed and the 
traditionally dominating value chain: large farms – food processing – retail market was 
not the only one any more. The household plots became more important in agriculture 
and market places and other delivery channels of unprocessed goods increased their 
importance. A dual structure of the agro-food value chain emerged.   
The GCC approach reviewed in the second section has studied – especially the studies 
under the buyer driven label – how the agro-food value chain is governed to meet the 
changed requirements in the retail market. Compared to changes in the Ukrainian food 
market, the studied changes in consumer behavior or the changed requirements of 
retailers have been minor. Still, the processes have enough common to justify the usage 
of the GCC approach. 
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Figure 3.2.2 The dual structure of the agro-food value chain in the 1990s. 
 
When the changes started in the beginning of the 1990s, it was obvious that all the 
agents were obliged to look for new ways to operate. The second part of this section 
focuses on their possibilities first, to adapt to new operating environment and, second, to 
become the governors of the agro-food chain. Third, it analyses their ability to upgrade.   
Agriculture 
The development of farms in the 1990s demonstrates a rather uncontrolled and non-
governed adaptation. True, we must make a difference between large farms and 
household plots. Several issues indicate the unfavorable development at large farms and 
only some of them can be reviewed here. The unfavorable position of farms in the value 
added chain is a combination of several problems (see Bostyn 2001: Bostyn & Boutsyn 
2001a). Some of them are directly linked to the agro-food sector but several are rooted 
in wider problems of Ukrainian economy, the weakness of the banking sector being a 
good example. To understand the position of farms in the beginning of 1990s it is useful 
to sum up changes they faced. Reduced budget support from the state made them 
dependent on the cash flow from selling produce. There was, however, no experience at 
the farm level to organize marketing. Management skills and know-how were lacking. 
Moreover, the farms did not possess the necessary infrastructure to be able to govern the 
value chain. Concerning several critical functions farms have been dependent on other 
agents of the value chain (Striewe 2001). Agriculture and the food industry were 
privatized, but the entire value chain and all of its actors were not privatized. The 
storage and transportation functions so critical to a system based on specialization (for 
example grain storage) were left under the direct or indirect control of the government 
or monopolies (see Agroperspektiva 2001b; Agroperspektive 2001c; Korchinskaia & 
Kucher 2001; Sedik 2001; Striewe 2001). Since the farms could not invest, they 
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remained dependent on the services offered by other agents of the chain, on the 
conditions that they dictated. 
As was noted above, the production of large farms decreased substantially. A decreased 
production does not necessarily mean that development has been adverse. In the 
conditions of diminished purchasing power and dual-structured food market, decreased 
production at large farms may have even meant a successful adaptation. Several 
indicators, however, reveal that adaptation was not successful. First, the farms 
accumulated serious debts. Second, they were not profitable but, instead, have made 
losses. Third, their ability to invest was seriously deteriorated. Moreover, they had 
continuous problems in carrying out their annual tasks like sowing and harvesting. To 
sum up, they had problems with both short-term operations and long-term structural 
things and they were not able to govern the change. After a brief review on indicators 
we focus on the reasons of the failure to govern the change.    
The two most revealing issues demonstrating the unfavorable position of farms in the 
value chain and their failure in adaptation to changed operating environment are their 
debts and losses as well as the amount and distribution of debts. According to the 
official statistics, agriculture in general was profitable in 1990-1995 but made losses in 
1996-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c). The reliability and value of this information can be 
questioned. First, the differences between goods have been tremendous. Second, despite 
the relatively successful years 1990-1995 the farms were not able to make necessary 
investments and accumulated serious debts. To conclude, although the official statistics 
about the economic performance of large farms show some good years, the large farms 
on average have performed very modestly and got involved in serious economic 
difficulties. 
According to several interviews, the proportion of large farms able to acquire the 
necessary farm machinery is no more than 10 % (Biba & Supikhanov 2001; Kuzmenko 
2001, Lisitsja 2001; Maksaev 2001; Nedvigin 2001). It is understandable that 
machinery investments require credits for several years and in a country in transition 
with a poorly working banking system and high interest rates it has been especially hard 
to receive credits for several years. The difficulties in receiving long-term credits are to 
some extent understandable. Until recently, the farms have not been able to receive even 
short-term credits, at least not from banks (Biba & Supikhanov, Kaliberda 2001; 
Lavrova 2000; Lavrova 2001; Marchenko 2001). One obvious reason for the credit 
problem has been the failure of land reform. 
When the economic reforms started in 1992, agricultural land was privatized. However, 
the legislation regulating and defining the property rights of land has had several serious 
inadequacies. The legislation has not yet enabled free buying, selling and the use of land 
as collateral. The ineligibility of land as collateral in loans has been the greatest flaw of 
land reform. Due to the negligible collateral value of other property on large farms, the 
ability of large farms to receive loans has been extremely limited (see Csaki & Lerman 
1997; Csaki & Lerman 2001; Lavrova 2001). 
Ukraine has not been an exemption with its difficulties in agricultural land reform. 
Moreover, the credit problems have been a common phenomenon in all the countries in 
transition, including the EU accession countries. A very clear conclusion from studies 
analyzing land reforms, agricultural credits and the overall success of agricultural 
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reforms is that those countries, which have privatized land and legalized ownership 
transactions, have performed better (see, for example, Lerman 2001). Because farms 
have been unable to use land as a collateral, their possibilities to acquire credits have 
been deteriorated. As a result, they have become dependent on other ways of acquiring 
credits. For example, input suppliers have become the creditors of agriculture. These 
other ways have been called “financial innovations” by Swinnen and Gow (1999). 
Although the financial innovations solve the acute problem of the funding of annual 
seasonal works like harvesting, they have certain consequences from the vantage point 
of the GCC approach.  
The distribution of debts demonstrates the logic of the problems of agriculture in 
receiving credits. By the end of 1999, the total amount of debts was approximately 3 
billion USD. Private input-suppliers have been the most important creditors of 
agriculture. They accounted for 45 % of debts. The amount of debts for inputs in 1998-
1999 was 650-700 million dollars. The total accumulated debt of farms to input-
suppliers was 1.4 billion USD in 1999 (Striewe & von Cramon-Taudabel & Sirin 2001).  
At the same time, of the total debts of farms 38 % was to state. Wage arrears to workers 
accounted for approximately 10 % of the debts. Only about 3 % of agriculture’s debts 
were to banks at the end of 1999 (Striewe & von Cramon-Taudabel & Sirin 2001). The 
reason is not that banks have been more successful in getting their money back but 
instead, banks have been unwilling and also unable to provide credits to farms (see 
Lavrova 2001). The amount of capital in banks was modest in the 1990s and banks 
preferred not to operate with agriculture and industry.  
The total debt is not, however, huge if we compare it to the annual revenue to farms. 
The amount of debt per large farm was approximately 200 000 USD at the end of 1999, 
no more than the price of one western middle-class combine. Moreover, the amount of 
debt was only 40 % of their annual revenue. To compare, this is less than the total debt 
of German farms, which need their entire income of two years to pay their debts. The 
total amount of debts is, therefore, not the most important obstacle to the development 
of agriculture.  
The unwillingness to provide agriculture with credits has much more to do with the 
reputation of farms and their liability than the accumulated amount of debts. Because 
commercial banks have been unwilling to deal with agriculture, other creditors have 
become more important. First, private input-suppliers have become the most important 
lenders to agriculture. The ability of farms to get loans for sowing and harvesting has 
been limited. That is why large farms have been in a difficult position in relation to 
input suppliers. The suppliers of fertilizers and fuel have begun to sell their products 
through bartering, and with the government’s blessing. In terms of terms of the GCC 
approach, this means that the input suppliers or traders providing farms with inputs can 
often dictate the prices of goods. Because farms do not posses the necessary 
infrastructure (logistics, storage, transport) they are almost totally dependent on other 
agents of the chain. Logistics, storage and transport would have been an obvious part of 
the value chain to upgrade but farms have been unable to upgrade; they have not 
possessed the necessary resources to invest.   
Second, the state has been an important creditor and, consequently, it has been able to 
do the most harm to agriculture with unsound support practices. The state has sought to 
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support agriculture with very limited resources and in conditions where farms had 
accumulated a serious debt burden and were not able pay back previous credits. The 
state has sought, however, to promote agricultural production.  
The agricultural policy of state has contributed to the unfavorable position of farms in 
the value chain. Commodity credits were a very common form of support in the 1990s. 
It should have enabled farms to acquire inputs with subsidized prices. The subsidies, 
however, were paid to input-suppliers. Worse, regional administrations were made 
responsible for payments. In case a regional administration could not acquire the 
required amount of grain – which was used as a payment – they faced, at least in theory, 
sanctions. Under such circumstances they restricted the outflow of grain outside their 
region. The restrictions were imposed on all farms in a region, not only on those with 
unsolved debts. This example demonstrates how regional administration have become 
involved in chain governance limiting the flow of goods and the free transactions of 
farms. In addition, the implemented practices in the farm support approved the use of 
barter (Chomiak 2001). From the farms’ vantage point, barter very often resulted in 
dependence and even higher prices of inputs than trade in money terms would have 
resulted.   
The monopolies in production and distribution of inputs have been one important reason 
for the debts. The prices for inputs have in many occasions been higher than the prices 
at the world market. On the other hand, poorly working marketing structures and, often, 
monopolies have cut the revenues reaching farms (Sedik 2001; Striewe 2001). 
High prices for inputs and low farm-gate prices for the goods produced have partly been 
rooted in the practices of agricultural policy, not only in the decreased purchasing power 
at the retail market (about farm-gate prices, see Sedik 2001; Striewe 2001). In other 
words, the state has preferred some agents of the agro-food chain and, consequently, 
dictated who is in the best position to govern the value chain.  In other words, who has 
the assets to govern the chain.  
To conclude, the indicators reviewed here reveal that although farms are indebted their 
financial position in terms of sums of money is actually not as gloomy as it seems to be 
at first sight. Rather, the problems of the farms seem to have a lot to do with liability 
and management practices. The unfortunate position the farms are in has been further 
escalated by the inefficient way in which the farms have been run. Large farms changed 
their official form of ownership, but generally maintained their working methods as 
they had been. The slow change of management practices holds for the state and 
regional authorities as well. Both authorities and farm level managers have been slow to 
adapt to new operating environment. They have tried to conserve as much of the 
previous practices as possible but without the previous high level of support.  
Large farms were not used to marketing the products themselves, since there was no 
existing previous tradition. The adverse financial position of the farms, a direct result of 
inadequate working capital and the inability to build a connection with a paying client, 
have created a dependency that is not easily removed. Producing agricultural products 
has not been as profitable as selling them. This demonstrates the importance of chain 
governance. The one who is governing the chain can easily dictate the prices. 
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As long as farms have not been able to use land as collateral, they have been forced to 
pledge future production as the only collateral for a loan. Since the land does not belong 
to its farmers, the production does not belong to its producers. The agricultural policy 
measures intended to support agriculture have mainly benefited the businesses tied to 
agriculture, not the agriculture itself. It would have required substantial investments to 
adapt to altered circumstances but attracting funds for investments appeared very 
difficult.  
To conclude, it appears that the unsuccessful adaptation to altered structures of demand 
have been rooted in the inadequacies of agricultural policy, which, in turn, has lead to a 
situation where input suppliers became the primary lenders to agriculture and, as a 
consequence, the governors of the chain because possessed the agricultural goods 
produced. This structure of the chain will be analyzed more thoroughly on a good-by-
good basis later on. 
As was noted above, individual farms have survived much better than large farms. 
Individual farms have not become heavily debted and they have found their niche in the 
restructured food market producing for the marketplaces and for themselves. Their 
production has slightly increased. There is, however, at least one issue where we can 
notice that even large farms have been able to adapt to market environment. The sown 
area of most profitable goods has clearly increased whereas the sown area of the least 
profitable goods has decreased (Derzhkomstat 2001c). Although large farms have been 
in a very difficult position and perhaps slow to actively adapt, some adaptation has 
taken place. Therefore, it is – to some extent – misleading to say that farms have been 
completely unable to adapt. They have perhaps sought to do what has been the easiest 
way to adapt; to change the goods grown but their operational principles have not 
changed.  
The traditional buyer driven approach stresses the importance of market information in 
chain governance. In the case of economies in transition, a wider approach to the issue 
of market information must be taken. It includes much more than mere consumer 
preferences. We must bear in mind that even the basic understanding about markets and 
their logic was lacking in the beginning of 1990s. The market information includes not 
only information about prices and preferences as such but also the entire system of price 
formation. Farms have not been used to acquire and analyze such information. Also, 
they have been unable to govern the chain and upgrade. This is to a large extent because 
they have been unable to invest.  
Food processing industry 
During the Soviet time, most of the enterprises in the food processing industry were 
large requiring large amounts of raw material and producing large quantities of food. 
Everything produced was hoarded without any marketing effort either in the domestic 
(Ukrainian) market or by consumers in other Soviet republics. Consumers’ preferences 
did not have to be taken into account in issues such as quality and product packaging. 
Plans substituted consumer preferences. The same holds for farms: command economy 
insulated them from market signals (see Lerman 2001).   
When the operating environment changed in the beginning of 1990s, changes occurred 
both in backward and forward linkages as well as in the food industry itself. First, the 
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backward linkages necessary to ensure raw-material supply altered when the basic 
structures of the agriculture changed. Raw-material supply and, especially, supply of 
high quality raw material was not guaranteed any more. Second, the forward linkages – 
wholesale and retail sales – changed. From the industry’s vantage point, a mere 
production was not enough to ensure the success in the market. Everything produced 
was not hoarded any more but both to establish marketing and retail trade became the 
preconditions to compete successfully (Boltina 2001; Krikun 2001). In other words, the 
food market opened up for competition. Moreover, purchasing power diminished 
markedly and the structure of food-market changed when the dual structure emerged. 
The changes called for governance of the entire chain; to restructure the food industry 
itself was not enough. 
However, the food industry itself was also restructured. The enterprises were privatized 
but in the beginning they mostly remained in the hands of the workers and/or managers 
(see Chernyshova et al. 2001; Gorton et al. 2002; Kaliberda 2001; Kuzmenko 2001). 
Food industry was slow to adapt to new conditions where the cash flow from retail sales 
became the only source of income. The volume of production decreased. 
The large enterprises with traditionally large volumes of production and ample labor 
force were not in a good position to adapt. The decline in purchasing power, the new 
structures of food market and the opening of the markets to competition caused 
problems. As a whole, the food processing industry has succeeded only modestly in 
adapting to the changed patterns of food consumption and market. Despite the drastic 
decrease of production, the amount of labor force has decreased only modestly. The 
amount of workers in food industry was 683 000 in 1990. The amount of workers was 
still 516 000 in 1999 (Derzhkomstat 2001a). However, behind the gloomy overall 
picture there is a more intricate picture including both failures and successes.  
Despite the gloomy figures, the food industry has been an attractive sector throughout 
the 1990s, invested in by both foreigners and Ukrainians. The attractiveness is partly 
explained because other sectors of the economy have succeeded even worse 
(Marchenko 2001). The food processing industry ranks second after 
telecommunications in FDIs in 1994-2000. The total amount of investment to food 
processing industry was 769 million USD (EBRD 2001). At the same time, 
telecommunications attracted 899 million USD. Concerning domestic investments, the 
sector ranked forth.  
The relatively high amount of investments demonstrates that despite the steady decline 
in production persistent towards the end of the decade, there has also been 
simultaneous, positive development. Apart from large enterprises having operated 
already during the Soviet time, new types of enterprises emerged.  New companies and 
operational models have surfaced, and old malfunctioning structures have withered 
away. The decreased amount of food sold at the retail market and the new dual structure 
of food market have called for new operational models to be able to adapt to altered 
conditions. This holds for the entire chain, i.e. chain governance has been required. 
There are roughly four types of enterprises in food industry. First, there are large 
enterprises originating in the Soviet times. They have been privatized but have been 
struggling with large production capacities and decreased demand. Second, there are 
new enterprises owned by Ukrainians who have invested in them. They are not as large 
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as the first group. Third, there are enterprises founded by FDIs. Forth, there are small 
enterprises employing only several employees (Chernyshova & Skripnik & Vinichenko 
2001). The first group has certainly succeeded worst.  
Despite its difficulties, the food processing industry has stood the best chance of all 
parts in the agro-food value chain to govern the chain, not only in Ukraine but in Russia 
as well (Ioffe & Nefedova 2001a). As has been noted before, the position of retailers in 
governing the buyer driven chain is based on market information. To compare with the 
agro-food value chain in Ukraine, we see a more intricate picture.  
The position of food industry in governing the chain has been based on several factors. 
First, it possesses a constant cash flow enabling investments. Second, food industry has 
attracted entrepreneurs and investments and even received loans from banks. The 
barriers to entry are relatively low and the constant demand for food and, consequently, 
constant cash flow has attracted entrepreneurs. In addition, it has received credits 
because it has something to offer as a collateral (Lavrova 2000; Lavrova 2001). Third, it 
has better information about consumers’ preferences and other things essential to 
compete in the retail market. Although food processing industry is in the best position to 
govern the change, not all enterprises have succeeded.   
Adjusting to new circumstances has demanded a structural change in the food industry. 
Privatization alone has not been a strong enough incentive to change the operational 
methods. The food industry operational model, based on very large production 
quantities both in primary production and processing, proved to be virtually unsuitable 
for the new environment, at least if not restructured. Several company examples show 
that simple measures – emphasis on high quality raw material, a correct production 
scale, sound marketing and production quality – can help to achieve a good position, 
profit and growth in the food market (Boltina 2001; Derevjanko & Ladoga 2001; 
Gagarina 2001; Kononevich 2001; Kovalenko 2001; Krikun 2001; Kuzmenko 2001; 
Marchenko 2001; Svjatikivska 2001a; Svjatikivska 2001b). In other words, the 
governance of the entire chain from primary production to sales has been required. Old 
and very large companies, on the other hand, have been faced with great difficulty. 
Success has often demanded either building an entirely new value chain or considerably 
restructuring the old (Boltina 2001; Kononevich 2001; Krikun 2001; Kuzmenko 2001). 
Both methods have called for investment.  
The recovery was closely linked to so called second wave of privatization, in which new 
owners took over the enterprises. The structural changes in the food processing industry 
and the growth in production over the last few years have been the consequence of new 
owners in the food industry, who have invested in companies and brought necessary 
know-how in marketing and management (Belov 2001; Boltina 2001; Kaliberda 2001; 
Rudenko 2001). The purchasing power has also developed favorably, particularly in 
larger cities. These issues have been of central importance to the development of the 
entire food processing chain.  
To sum up, it seems obvious why processing industry could become the governor of the 
chain. Compared to agriculture, it possessed much better possibilities to adapt. It had 
relatively stable money income, it attracted investments and it became quite soon aware 
of the requirements of the opened food market. Moreover, it attracted entrepreneurs able 
and willing to restructure not only the industry itself but also the entire value chain. 
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Apparently, it was the combination of all these factors enabling the food processing 
industry to become the chain governor. Not all food processing companies, however, 
succeeded. There are several reasons for that. The ones who succeeded realized the 
importance of competitiveness, an issue totally neglected during the Soviet period.  In 
addition, the successful companies used the opportunity of emerging markets and 
changing condition in the retail market. However, the in-depth analysis of successful 
upgrading needs to be done by value-chain basis, not on the level of industry.  
4 Four Case Studies 
4.1 Sugar 
4.1.1 Sugar production 
Sugar beet production and entire sugar refining value chain have been one of the most 
important value chains in Ukraine for decades. Apart from producing for the domestic 
market, Ukraine accounted for roughly a half of the sugar production in the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s (Statistcheskii komitet sodruzhestva 1992). The export of white 
sugar to other Soviet republics in 1990 was 3.3 million tonnes of which 2.5 million 
tonnes went to Russia. In 1991, Ukraine exported 1.6 millions of tonnes of sugar to 
other Soviet republics, roughly one third of its production. The rapid decrease in exports 
is rooted in Ukraine’s own measures; one moment it prohibited the export of sugar to 
other Soviet republics when the inter-republican system of exchange of goods was on 
the verge of the total collapse in 1991 (Gaidar 1996). It needed something to trade with 
other Soviet republics and ceased temporarily to supply other republics with sugar in the 
inter-republican system of exchange of goods. To sum up, Ukraine clearly had an 
excess capacity for its domestic market when the trade with other former Soviet 
republics ceased to be inter-republican and turned into foreign trade.  
The loss of guaranteed demand in the most important export market was not the only 
change encountered by the sugar sector. The entire value-added chain of sugar 
production, processing and distribution was obliged to adapt in entirely new operation 
environment. Large farms producing sugar beet had been used to huge subsidies having 
enabled an ample use of inputs including fertilizers, pesticides and machinery. During 
the Soviet period, the large farms accounted for almost 100 % of sugar beet production 
and the pattern has remained quite stable throughout the 1990s. The proportion of large 
farms has decreased gradually but was still 88 % in 2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c).  
When the Soviet period became to end and the economic reforms started in 1992, sugar 
beet growers as well as all the other agricultural producers encountered totally altered 
conditions. The ample supplies of inputs halted and, more importantly, subsidies were 
cut. What is more important, the importance of competitiveness and the ability to 
establish a competitive value-added chain to compete either at the retail sales market or 
to supply sugar for processing industry started to dictate the amount of income. In other 
words, both the input side and marketing changed completely. The chain governance 
would have been needed to downscale the volume of the production of the entire value-
chain. The adaptation process appeared to be very difficult and production decreased.  
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Table 4.1.1 Production of sugar beet (million tonnes), yield/hectare (tonnes) and sown 
area (million hectares) in 1990-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c).   
 
The production of sugar beet in Ukraine was 36 million tonnes in 1991. Since then the 
production has declined. During the period 1996-2000 the production was on average 
1.7 million tonnes a year having declined towards the end of the period. There are two 
simple reasons for decreased production. First, the sown area of sugar beet has 
decreased. Second, the use of inputs has reduced (fertilizers, pesticides) having caused 
the decreased yields per hectare. In addition, the agricultural machinery at farms 
deteriorated (Jakel 2001; Derzhkomstat 2001e). The yield on average was 23.4 
tonnes/ha in 1991 but decreased during 1990s and was only 17.7 in 2000 being roughly 
one third of the average harvest per hectare in Western Europe. The decreased sown 
area typifies the farm level adaptation when they reduce the sown area of sugar and 
prefer other – more profitable – crops. 
The production of white sugar has also decreased. The white sugar production was 6.8 
million tonnes in 1990 of which approximately a half, 3.3 million tonnes, was exported 
to other Soviet republics. The production decreased in the 1990s and was only 1,8 
million tonnes in 2000. Simultaneously, the consumption of sugar decreased in Ukraine. 
The per capita consumption of sugar was 50 kilos a year in 1990 decreasing after that 
and being at the record lowest 31 kilos in 1997 (see tables 3.1.2. and 3.1.3). The 
consumption increased slightly towards the end of the decade and was 34 kilos per 
capita in 2000, meaning that the total domestic consumption was 1.7 million tonnes 
(Derzhkomstat 2001a). To sum up, the production of white sugar matches quite well 
with the amount consumed in the domestic market. On one hand, the sugar sector 
downscaled production as far as the volume of production matches with the 
consumption. On the other hand, the diminished yields per hectare in agriculture and the 
existing excess capacity in the processing industry demonstrate that the downscaling has 
not been governed properly.   
4.1.2 Sugar exports 
Because as much as a half of the sugar production was exported during the Soviet 
period and the sector was highly dependent on exports in the beginning of 1990s, it is 
worth having a closer look on the exports and, in particular, on the exports in 1996-
2000. Exports continued mostly by bilateral agreements until the mid-1990s. The 
exports in general and exports to Russia in particular peaked in 1996 and 1997. After 
that, the volume of sugar exports then diminished towards the end of the 1990s and 
ceased almost completely in 2000.  
When Ukraine’s sugar exports reached a peak in 1996, Russia was accounting for 75 % 
of exports. According to the statistics of Ukrainian Statistics Committee the value of 
exports was 422 million USD, the Russian statistics giving a larger value (see below).  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production 44 36 29 34 28 30 23 18 16 14 13 
Yield/hectare 27.6 23.4 19.4 22.2 19.2 20.5 18.3 17.6 17.4 15.6 17.7 
Sown area 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 
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Table 4.1.2. The value of sugar* exports from the Ukraine in 1996-2000 and the five 
most important export destinations (Derzhkomstat 2001b). 
 The value of sugar exports, 
million USD 
The 5 most important export 
destinations (million USD) 
 
1996 543 Russia (422) 
Belarus (29) 
Uzbekistan (27) 
Azerbaidzhan (19) 
Turkmenistan (17) 
 
1997 243 Russia (162) 
Belarus (24) 
Azerbaidzhan (16) 
Turkmenistan (9) 
Georgia (7)  
 
1998 38 Russia (19) 
Azerbaidzhan (9)  
Turkmenistan (4) 
Belarus (3) 
 
1999 22 Russia (13) 
Turkmenistan (5) 
Azerbaidzhan (2) 
 
2000 6 Turkmenistan (5) 
* white sugar customs code 17.01.99.100  
 
The value of total white sugar imports to Russia was 670 million USD in 1996, the 
proportion for the Ukraine being (according to the Russian Customs Committee 
Statistics) 570 million USD (85 %). After that, the overall value of Russia’s white sugar 
exports decreased and was only 139 million USD in 2000, when import from the 
Ukraine had already ceased. By then, Belarus had become the most important importer.  
Russia has traditionally had three options to meet the needs of sugar consumption. First, 
to import white sugar. Second, to import sugar cane for processing. Third, to grow 
sufficient amount of sugar beet for processing and meeting domestic demand. The third 
option is not realistic, because the amount of land suitable for growing sugar beet is 
limited and there are alternative crops, often more profitable, to be grown. Russia has 
been able to cover no more than approximately one quarter of its production by 
processing sugar from domestic beet. Already during the Soviet period, Russia was 
dependent on imported sugar. The requirements were fulfilled by white sugar imports 
from Ukraine and sugar cane imports from Cuba, which was processed in Russia. For 
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example, Russia produced 2,6 million tonnes of white sugar both from sugar cane and 
beet, importing additional 2,5 million tonnes of white sugar from Ukraine in 1990.  
In the early 1990s, Russia continued to import approximately 1.5 million tonnes of 
white sugar annually. Until 1994 there was no effective regulation of the Russian sugar 
market or foreign trade (Karlova et al. 2001). Up to 85 % of sugar cane was imported 
from Cuba by bilateral clearing-system. Russia introduced an import tariff of 20 % for 
white sugar in 1994 and it was increased to 25 % in 1995. The introduction of those 
measures did not, however, have any desired effect on white sugar imports. On the 
contrary, the import of white sugar increased, the reason being decreased sugar import 
from Cuba, which had unilaterally changed the conditions of bilateral agreements. The 
demand for sugar remained, however, at the same level and the decreased imports of 
sugar cane were compensated by imports of white sugar. In addition, white sugar, unlike 
sugar cane, was exempted from 10 % of VAT. Because of the difficulties with imports 
from Cuba, Ukraine became again the largest importer of sugar to Russia in 1995. Apart 
from favourable tax regime for white sugar as a whole, Ukraine and the other CIS 
countries benefited from the duty-free import regime. Due to duty-free import regime, a 
significant amount of white sugar from third countries was (re-)exported to Russia via 
Ukraine (Karlova et al. 2001).  
In 1996, Ukraine was by far the most important importer of white sugar accounting for 
85 % of imports. At the same time, seven countries accounted for virtually (99 %) all 
sugar cane imports, Cuba accounting for 69 %. Because of the devaluation of Brazilian 
currency and a drop in world market prices, the proportion of Brazil in Russia’s imports 
rose markedly and it became the largest importer in 1999 (tables 4.1.3. and 4.1.4). 
Simultaneously, a clear shift from white sugar imports to sugar cane imports took place. 
White sugar imports continued, but the volume decreased. This is typified by the 
decreased import from Ukraine. The change was rooted in a clear shift in Russia’s trade 
policy that was lobbied by the domestic sugar industry to improve the competitiveness 
of sugar refining from both sugar cane and domestic sugar beet (Karlova et al. 2001: 
Hilz-Ward et al. 2001).   
In may 1996 Russia introduced an import duty for white sugar to protect domestic sugar 
production, including sugar beet and white sugar, the amount of tariff being one percent 
for raw cane sugar from CIS countries and 25 % duty on white sugar from CIS 
countries. Additional measures were implemented in 1998 when imports were licensed. 
Ukraine was guaranteed an import quota of 600 000 tons of duty free sugar exports to 
Russia. Ukraine could not, however, export the amount the quota would have allowed. 
The reason was that the price of Ukrainian sugar was higher than the price of sugar in 
the world market and the companies having the licenses to import the duty-free sugar 
were not interested in it (Karlova et al. 2001). The table below demonstrates the altered 
pattern of sugar imports to Russia, the most important change from Ukraine’s vantage 
point being the shift from white sugar imports to sugar cane imports for processing in 
Russia.  
Moreover, the pattern of white sugar imports changed. The proportion of Ukraine 
decreased whereas the proportion of non-CIS countries increased, Poland, France and 
the UK strengthening their positions. In addition, the volume of sugar imports from 
Belarus increased markedly.  
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Table 4.1.3. The volume and value of raw cane sugar and white sugar imports to Russia 
1996-2000 (Hilz-Wrd et al. 2001).  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Raw cane sugar 
Million 
tones 
1.7* 2.6  
(2.5*) 
3.7 
(3.7*) 
5.8 (5.8*) 4.5 
(4.5*) 
Value, 
million 
USD 
592* 853  
(806*) 
1089 
(1082*)  
1137 
(1132*) 
690 
(690*) 
White sugar 
Million 
tones 
1.44 1.07 0.57 0.34 0.47 
Value, 
million 
USD 
668 398 
336* 
214 
127* 
104 
36* 
139 
75* 
*= Russia Customs Committee Data which does not show imports from Belarus. 
 
Russia introduced in 1998 seasonal restrictions and regulation measures for all kinds of 
sugar imports to prevent the simultaneous imports of sugar cane when domestic sugar 
beet was harvested and processed. A seasonal import duty of 74 % was introduced 
beginning in August and ending in December. The duties were increased in 1999 and 
2000. The ultimate goal of the sugar refining industry – the increase of sugar production 
– was achieved. Already during the first half of 1998, the production of white sugar 
increased twofold, simultaneously the import of sugar cane increased by 600 %. At the 
same time, the production of sugar beet and the sown area decreased. As Karlova et al. 
(2001) argue, the increased production of sugar did not benefit the sugar beet growers.  
To further decrease the volume of imports, a new tool of regulation was introduced in 
1999. The ultimate aim of licensing the imports and selling the quotas by auctions was 
to encourage the sugar processors to replace sugar cane imports by domestic sugar beet. 
This would have meant, however, that domestic processors would have taken the burden 
of improving and developing the sugar beet production on themselves. Already the 
devaluation of rouble in 1998 had encouraged increasing the use of domestic raw 
material. Trade policy measures taken to restrict sugar cane imports were implemented 
to extend this practice (Karlova et al. 2001). 
To conclude, there are several simple reasons for the reduced Ukrainian exports to 
Russia. First, Russia has replaced imports from the Ukraine by increasing domestic 
sugar production. Second, both consumption and volume of the retail sugar trade 
decreased approximately 10% during the second half of the 1990s. 
 41
Table 4.1.4. The distribution of sugar cane and white sugar imports to Russia and price 
per tonne by countries in 1996 and 1998-2000 (Hilz-Ward et al 2001). 
 1996 1998 1999 2000 
 % of 
imports
Price/ 
tonne 
% of 
imports
Price/ 
tonne 
% of 
imports
Price/ 
tonne 
% of 
imports 
Price/ 
tonne 
Sugar cane 
Australia 0 811 2.0 299 - - - - 
Brazil 19.4 361 38.0 303 51.4 197 40.2 153 
Columbia  - - 0.6 290 1.7 199 5.7 169 
Costa Rica - - 1.1 321 0.8 180 0.5 159 
Cuba 69.1 348 41.0 285 31.6 199 45.0 148 
El Salvador - - 1.6 298 1.3 213 1.5 169 
Guatemala 3.7 343 8.3 292 1.9 193 - - 
India 1.5 379 0.3 363 - - - - 
Mexico - - 2.9 291 - - - - 
Nicaragua - - 0.2 265 1.2 198 - - 
RSA 1.8 372 2.0 297 2.3 176 - - 
Thailand 2.4 384 2.1 337 7.3 184 6.1 152 
Zimbabwe 1.2 349 - - - - 0.4 135 
Others 0.9 375 0.0 274 0.0 217 - - 
Total 100 353 100 295 100 196 100 152 
White sugar 
Belarus - - 35.2 - 63.3 - 42.0 - 
Brazil  2.0 217 2.5 289 1.5 261 - - 
Czech rep. - - 1.2 328 - - - - 
Denmark 0.0 546 3.2 311 - - 0.8 265 
Germany 2.7 394 3.1 337 0.1 748 5.7 274 
France 0.7 378 10.5 324 0.1 433 17 261 
India 2.3 362 - - - - - - 
Kazahstan 1.6 571 - 491 - - - - 
Latvia 0.7 292 - - - - - - 
Moldova 4.5 529 1.2 483 0.4 319 0.0 400 
Poland 0.1 411 12.8 319 13.1 253 13.0 288 
Slovakia - - 0.7 312 0.1 433 17.3 261 
Sweden 0.1 467 2.2 314 - - 4.0 289 
UK 0.1 545 13.3 322 1.9 329 0.1 - 
Ukraine 83.7 474 7.6 374 18.2 294 - - 
Others 1.1 511 6.4 374 1.7 433 - - 
Total 100 465 100 359 100 303 100 297 
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This decrease does not, however, explain that big decrease in exports from the Ukraine. 
Obviously a more important reason is that Russia has imported raw sugar cane for 
processing from other countries, Cuba and Brazil being the most important. 
4.1.3 GCC and sugar  
Now that we have described the overall picture of the sugar production and exports, it is 
time to have a closer look at the value chain using the GCC approach; whether it can 
assist us in understanding the changes and, in particular, ceased export. As was noted in 
the second section, the GCC approach has traditionally been used to study cross-border 
trade and, in particular, trade between developing and developed countries. The 
Ukrainian agro-food exports provide an interesting case where domestic commodity 
chain (inside the Soviet Union) turned into a cross-border one.  
When the Soviet Union collapsed, sugar beet and white sugar production in Ukraine 
was one of the commodity chains supplying Russia with sugar (Figure 4.1.1). The other 
major chains were processing white sugar in Russia by using Russian sugar beet and 
sugar cane imports from Cuba.processed in Russia The white sugar imports from 
Ukraine to Russia were 2.5 million tones in 1990 and sugar refining in Russia 2.6 
million tones. Ukraine produced additional 3.5 million tones for its domestic market. 
The sugar commodity chain was governed, as was the entire agro-food sector, by central 
planning monopolies. Their priorities were dictated by ideology having sought for self-
sufficiency i.e. to produce as much of the required food as possible inside the Soviet 
Union.  
For analyzing the sugar commodity chain in 1990s by using the GCC approach we can 
focus on two periods of time. First, a period until 1996-1997 when Ukraine was still the 
most important importer of white sugar to Russia and, second, beginning in 1998 when 
the exports to Russia ceased. The key feature of the operating environment has been the 
decreased production of both sugar beet and white sugar, the ceased imports to Russia 
being the most important single reason for the decrease. The challenge encountered by 
the sugar sector has been the obvious need to downscale production.  
The analysis using the GCC approach should give special emphasis on the position of 
farms in the value chain. The reasons for the unfavorable position of farms growing 
sugar are common with other sectors of crop production. To put briefly, the input 
markets have not functioned properly, support has decreased, demand for its produce 
has decreased and farms have been unable to adapt (Bostyn & Boutsyn 2001b). The 
demand for sugar decreased more than demand for several other goods because of the 
large proportion of production was exported and the exports ceased. The income from 
domestic retail sales has been inadequate to cover the costs of production and to 
maintain the excess production capacity. The profitability of the sugar production has 
been among the lowest in agriculture.  At the farm level, the sown area has decreased 
which can be considered as adequate response to low profitability compared to other 
goods. Apart from the diminished sown area, the decreased production can be explained 
by the decreased yields per hectare. The decreased yields demonstrate the diminished 
use of inputs, which, in turn, demonstrates the poor financial position of farms.  
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Figure 4.1.1. The GCC of sugar production in the Soviet Union in 1990. 
Compared to the goods to be analyzed in the following chapters, the production of sugar 
beet and especially its deliveries to processing companies have not fragmented. In 1990, 
the share of deliveries was almost 100 % and, compared to other agro-food goods, the 
share delivered by other channels has increased only modestly. The proportion of sugar 
beet delivered to processing companies was more than 90 % throughout the 1990s 
(Derzhkomstat 2001d).  
There are, however, some features in the value chain deserving our attention. First, the 
deliveries of sugar beet to processing are so called “davalheskie”. It means, first, that 
the producer of sugar beet does not receive any money for the beets delivered. Instead, 
they receive certain amount of the refined sugar. Second, it may mean that the refinery 
receives only certain amount of the sugar and the rest goes to the provider of sugar beet. 
The share of those deliveries was 98 % in 1995 meaning that virtually all deliveries 
from farms to processing industry were in these terms (Derzhkomstat 2001d). Of 
course, farms could have sold the sugar themselves in the market and to some extent 
they certainly did. We must, however, bear in mind the unfavorable position of farms in 
terms of input-suppliers. Sugar beet production as a rule has been unprofitable and has 
led to substantial debts. Therefore, it is possible that farms have been obliged to deliver 
the sugar beet or the refined sugar further to input-suppliers or other middlemen. In 
addition, the ability of farms to acquire information about the sugar markets is modest 
in case they want to sell the sugar they have received.  
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Why the “davalcheskie” terms have become so widely used? Being on the verge of 
bankruptcy, neither farms nor processing companies can show money on their accounts 
but, rather, they get involved into barter and “davalcheskie” transactions. To tax 
production delivered by “davalcheskie” terms is more difficult. It is interesting to note 
that the amount of sugar produced in Russia by using “davalcheskie” terms has also 
been as high as 90 %. However, of the deliveries of sugar beet to processing by farms 
only 50 % are “davalcheskie” (Avdasheva 2001). It means that there are traders 
acquiring sugar beet from farms and delivering them to processing companies operate 
by “davalcheskie” terms. We have reason to believe that pattern can be quite similar in 
Ukraine meaning that there are traders between farms and processing companies.  
As was noted above, Ukraine was able to maintain its position in the Russian market 
until 1996-1997 and the picture in terms of the GCC looked as follows. There were still 
three channels supplying Russian market with sugar: white sugar imports from Ukraine, 
Russian sugar beet production processed in Russia and sugar cane imports processed in 
Russia. As was noted above, the value chain and the market were governed neither by 
the Ukrainians nor Russians (Karlova et al. 2001; Analiticheskaia sluzhba “Sahara 
Ukrainy” 2001). No efficient trade policy measures were implemented by Russians and 
the domestic efforts to regulate Ukrainian domestic market failed (Bostyn & Boutsyn 
2001b). This holds especially for the governance of market as a whole by using trade 
policy measures by authorities. Processing industry was not able to govern the chain by, 
for instance, improving the efficiency of agriculture by investing.   
 
Figure 4.1.2. The GCC of Ukrainian and Russian sugar in 1996. 
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Figure 4.1.3. The GCC of Ukrainian and Russian sugar in 2000 
Towards the end the decade the decline of the sugar sector continued. The production in 
Ukraine continued to decrease. The most important change was, of course, that exports 
ceased. The main structures of the domestic value chain remained the same. The 
proportion of sugar beet delivered to processing companies from farms was 85 % in 
2000. At the same time, the proportion of sugar beet sold at the market place was only 9 
%, the proportions of sugar beet delivered by barter and to workers (mostly instead of 
salary) were 5 % and 1 % respectively.  
The “davalchekie” transactions continued to dominate the deliveries from farms to 
processing industry but their share leveled off to 52.9 % in 2000, a sudden change after 
the shares being 90.3 % and 93.0 % in 1998 and 1999 (Derzkomstat 2001d). 
The figure demonstrates that exports from Ukraine have ceased. The preferred value 
chain includes domestic sugar beet and, first of all, sugar cane imports and the refining 
of them in Russia. Moreover, the imports from Belarus increased and it superseded 
Ukraine. Obviously, the Russian processing industry and the government responsible 
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for trade policy were the ones who were able to govern the chain. They changed the 
conditions so that domestic processing industry and sugar beet growers were provided 
trade policy rents and Ukraine was superseded.  
The entire sugar sector in Ukraine was unable to adapt to altered operating environment. 
It was unable to downscale the production and to find the proper ways to restructure the 
sector. The production decreased but the excess capacity remained. The sugar beet 
production was not profitable and both farms and processing companies got involved in 
“davalcheskie” transactions. Both farms and processing companies were unable to 
govern the chain to enable the adaptation. Moreover, the Ukrainian government was 
unable to govern the change and to restructure the sector although it introduced several 
plans and measures to restructure (see Bostyn & Boutsyn 2001b). The GCC approach 
should enable us to analyze the cross border dimension of the sugar value chain linking 
Ukraine and Russia and Ukraine’s failure. Who was governing the chain and can the 
ceased exports be explained with the assistance of the concepts of the GCC approach?  
During the communist period, the position of Ukraine was to produce sugar to supply 
Russia and other Soviet republics with sugar. Governance was implemented from 
outside the chain. The entire structure dictating the exchange of goods changed in the 
1990s. Markets gradually replaced planning organizations. This holds for both domestic 
and foreign trade in Ukraine as well as in Russia. As was argued above, neither Russia 
nor Ukraine could govern the sugar market and production in the early 1990s. As a 
result, the basic pattern of the three supply channels of Russian sugar market continued 
and exports from Ukraine continued. None was able to take role of the governor of the 
chain. Both agriculture and industry were weak in economic terms and authorities could 
not introduce the necessary measure to bring trade policy rents to any of the agents.  
Focusing on the development during the second half of the 1990s we should be able to 
find the agents governing the chain and the reasons for ceased imports. The government 
of the Russian Federation implemented effective measures to govern the sugar market 
and production in 1997 (Karlova et al. 2001; Hilz-Ward et al. 2001). Trade barriers 
were erected and certain supply channels were preferred. Ukrainian sugar was no more 
competitive in the Russian market even though it was guaranteed an import quota for 
some time.  
Russia sought to boost domestic sugar production by encouraging processing companies 
– often holding companies with several sugar refineries (see Tsentr politicheskoi 
informatsii 2002) – to assist agriculture. In other words, to intensify chain governance. 
However, the processors opted and lobbied for imported raw material rather than 
increased involvement in domestic commodity chain (Karlova et al. 2001). Trade policy 
measures shaped the preconditions for competition so decisively that Ukraine was 
unable to compete. In terms of GCC approach, competing supply channels benefited 
decisively from trade policy rents but Ukraine lacked any.  
Ukraine did not lose its position in the Russian market because of inadequate 
information about the prices or other requirements of the market: quality, JIT supplies 
etc. Rather, it lost the market because there were several alternative suppliers available 
and Russia and the Russian importers preferred to deal with them. In that case, the sugar 
value chain is certainly not a buyer driven in a sense that retailers can govern the chain 
because they have the necessary information about consumers’ preferences and they can 
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exclude those suppliers who cannot meet the quality requirements. Sugar – no matter 
where it is produced – is virtually similar everywhere and the requirements of 
consumers and retailers are dominated by price, not the product variety or other things 
typical of horticulture goods. Further, there are numerous alternative suppliers available. 
These remarks about sugar market bring us quite close to Gibbon’s views about 
international trader driven chains. Both Russia and Ukraine became a part of the world 
market and could choose from various locations to acquire raw materials. Russia has 
preferred to support domestic sugar beet production and Russian traders have preferred 
the most efficient ways to acquire raw materials. Traders might have preferred Ukraine 
had it been competitive. To remind, Gibbon argued that international trader driven 
chains occur if, first, the supply pattern is either globally dispersed or locally 
discontinuous. Second, if there is a strong tendency “toward market saturation, brought 
about by a combination of partial substitution by new agricultural products, accelerated 
entry by new suppliers and low price-elasticity of demand”. The second point holds 
quite well for sugar. The Ukrainian sugar was easily substituted by sugar cane imports.  
Although the GCC fails to substantially contribute to our understanding of dynamics of 
the sugar exports to Ukraine, it still has something to offer. The imbalance of market 
information or other conditions leading to buyer driven chains listed by Dolan & Tewari 
(2001) and, consequently, the need to implement chain governance can be present also 
in value chains inside one country. The barter and “davalcheskie” terms of trade stress 
the unfavorable position of farms in the commodity chain. It hinders their possibilities 
to upgrade and reach any authority in chain governance. In case they are obliged to use 
middlemen in delivering their produce because of inadequate information about 
markets, the case of Ukrainian sugar may also stress the importance of market 
information in chain governance. Also, to be able to trade sugar access to capital has 
been required. The case differs, however, from the traditional buyer driven case of 
horticulture, because price dictates the success in sugar markets. The market 
information is important not only in buyer driven chains. Gibbon stresses the 
importance of market information also concerning international trader driven chain. To 
conclude, the GCC of Ukrainian sugar – both concerning export and domestic markets – 
seems to be in tune with Gibbon’s international trader driven chain although the GCC of 
Ukrainian sugar turned into a predominantly domestic commodity chain in the 1990s. I 
argue, however, that we find international buyer driven chain very fruitful in explaining 
the ceased sugar exports of Ukraine and it can contribute in our understanding of the 
dynamics of value chain even inside one country, especially in terms of market 
information. 
4.2 Sunflower Seed and Oil 
4.2.1 Sunflower seed and oil production 
Sugar production and processing provided an example of a failed value-added chain and 
deteriorated competitiveness. The sunflower is something different. The conditions for 
growing sunflowers are very favourable in Ukraine. True, that is the case for sugar, too. 
Growing sunflower has been one of the few success stories of the Ukrainian agriculture 
and it became the most profitable and attractive sector of agriculture in the 1990s (APK-
Inform 2001a; Derzhavnii komitet statistiki 2001c; Striewe 2001; Von Cramon-
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Taubadel & Striewe 2001). Moreover, Ukraine is one of the leading producers of 
sunflower in the world accounting for approximately 10 % of the total world 
production. 
It typifies quite well the adverse development of the agro-food sector that even the 
production of the most successful good – sunflower – did not increase in the 1990s with 
the exception of year 2000. However, compared to most of the agricultural goods, 
sunflower production survived well. The production of sunflower seeds was 2.3 million 
tonnes in 1991. The production fluctuated in the early 1990s and was 2.1 million tonnes 
in 1996. The fluctuation continued, but a collapse was avoided. The production reached 
a peak of 3.5 million tonnes in 2000.   
The proportion of sown area under sunflower increased in the 1990s demonstrating the 
profitability and, consequently, willingness to grow sunflower at the farm level. The 
sown area of sunflower was 1.6 million hectares in 1990. The sown area increased 
steadily towards the mid-1990s and was 2.0 hectares in 1996. The growth continued and 
the sown area in 2000 was 2.8 million hectares. The increased sown area indicates that 
farms have decided to allocate resources from other crops to sunflower. The use of 
inputs, however, decreased and the increased harvests towards the end of the 1990s 
were achieved because the sown area increased.  
Growing sunflower was the most profitable form of agricultural production in 1992-
1995 and 1998-1999. Growing grain was more profitable in 1996-1997 but sunflower 
ranked second. The reliability of the statistics concerning farm level accountancy and 
profitability must not be taken literally. A far better indicator of profitability is the 
increased sown area.  
The dynamics of sunflower oil production did not follow the same successful path of 
sunflower seeds. The production of vegetable oil – which is mostly sunflower oil – was 
1.10 million tonnes in 1990. During the early 1990s production decreased and was 0.70 
million tonnes in 1995. The production was at its lowest in 1998 and 1999, only 0.51 
million and 0.57 million tonnes respectively, but recovered rapidly in 2000 being 0.97 
million tonnes. In addition, the production of margarine increased quite rapidly in 1999 
and 2000 (see Table 3.1.2). The reason for the rapid increase was rooted in improved 
raw material supply that will be discussed more thoroughly later on.  
 
Table 4.2.1. The production of sunflower seed (million tonnes), yield/hectare (tones) 
and sown area (million hectares) in Ukraine 1990-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c).  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production  2.6 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.6 
Yield 15.8 14.6 13.0 12.7 9.1 14.2 10.5 11.5 9.3 10.0 12.2 
Sown area 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.8 
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4.2.2 Sunflower seed and oil exports 
Apart from domestic market, export became a decisive factor shaping the sector. 
Ukraine exported both sunflower seeds and oil in 1996-2000. The changed pattern of 
seed and oil exports demonstrates the upgrading of the production along the value chain. 
The table below demonstrates the changes in the seed exports. Throughout the entire 
period 1996-2000, the EU countries were the most important destination of exports, 
France, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium and Italy being the most important.  
The exports peaked in 1997 and 1998 but decreased markedly after that. At the same 
time, we notice a marked increase in sunflower oil exports in 1999 and especially 2000. 
Prior to the increase, Russia and Belarus and Switzerland dominated in the destinations 
of oil exports. The increase in oil exports meant especially increased exports to Russia. 
As far as the increase in oil exports seemed to have taken place at the expense of seed 
exports, investigating the case using the GCC should be particularly fruitful. What were 
the reasons that enabled the upgrading of the production and, in particular, exports 
towards more value-added goods?  
Table 4.2.2. The value of sunflower seed exports 1996-2000 and the five most 
important export destinations (Derzhkomstat 2001b). 
 The value of sunflower seed 
exports (million USD) 
The 5 most important export 
destinations (million USD) 
1996 173 France (23)  
Spain (23)  
The Netherlands (21)  
Turkey (16)  
Italy (12) 
1997 223 The Netherlands (38)  
Turkey (32)  
Belgium (28) 
Spain (23)  
Italy (18) 
1998 207 Turkey (35) 
The Netherlands (33) 
France (27)  
Spain (24)  
Belgium (17) 
1999 100 Turkey (16) 
Spain (15)  
Morocco (9)  
Italy (9) 
Russia (7) 
2000 136 The Netherlands (26)  
Spain (26)  
Portugal (15)  
Turkey (15) 
Georgia (9)  
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The changed export pattern included increased sunflower oil exports to Russia, which 
became the largest export market. It is fruitful to have a look at the position of exports 
from Ukraine in the Russia’s total imports. Ukraine was the largest importer in 1996 but 
its proportion decreased markedly in 1997 when Argentina and Hungary superseded it. 
A significant change took place in 1999 when exports to Russia from Ukraine increased 
threefold. Argentina, however, remained the largest importer in 1999. The table below 
demonstrates that simultaneously with increased exports to Russia, Ukraine became the 
largest importer of sunflower in 2000.  
To conclude, prior to 1999 Ukraine exported large amounts of sunflower seed and this 
should have enabled rather favourable development also in the farm level. At the same 
time, domestic processing had hard times. Then a sudden change took place and the 
marked upgrading took place and Ukraine increased domestic production and conquered 
a strong position in the Russian market.  
4.2.3 GCC and sunflower 
Prior to the change in export pattern the GCC of Ukrainian sunflower looked as follows. 
Large firms have accounted for most of the production (97 % in 1990, 87 % in 2000). In 
1990, farms growing sunflower seed delivered virtually all their production to 
processing plants. This picture started to change rapidly when the Soviet period ended 
and the structure of seed deliveries became more diversified.  
In the early 1990s, there were several characteristics that made the sunflower sector a 
special case in the agro-food sector. First, it was the most profitable good. Second, 
government intervention was moderate compared to grain market (Von Cramon-
Taudabel & Striewe 2001). For example, the proportion of government procurements 
was low compared to grain. Von Cramon-Taudabel and Striewe even argue that the 
success of the sunflower seed production was rooted in the laissez-faire attitude of the 
government towards the sector (see also APK-Inform 2001a; Striewe 2001). The 
laissez-faire attitude was not based on true commitment on liberal economic policy. 
Instead, the sector was forgotten and neglected while more attention was paid on goods 
traditionally important in terms of food security, especially grain.  
The third specific feature of the sunflower seed market has been the importance of the 
traders in marketing the seeds. During the 1990s, barter became a very common 
phenomenon. More than half of the seeds produced were delivered by barter 
(Derzhkomstat 2001d). The firms exporting or trading the seeds have often supplied 
agriculture with essential inputs (fuel, energy and fertilizers). In 1995, the distribution 
of deliveries of seeds looked as follows. Only 5 % of the seeds were delivered straight 
to processing companies. Other channels of deliveries were barter (55 %), to workers 
instead of salary (12 %) and to market (28 %), the latest apparently including money 
transactions with traders and middlemen. 
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Table 4.2.3. The value of sunflower oil exports from the Ukraine in 1996-2000 and the 
five most important destinations each year (Derzhavnii komitet statistiki 2001c). 
 The value of sunflower oil exports  
(million USD) 
The 5 most important export 
destinations (million USD) 
 
1996 105 Russia (48)  
Belarus (25)  
Turkey (20) 
Switzerland (15)  
UK (11) 
 
1997 109 Belarus (25) 
Russia (20)  
Switzerland (15) 
Turkey (14) 
Algeria (5) 
 
1998 122 Switzerland (24)  
Russia (20)  
Belarus (14) 
Seychelles (9) 
Hungary (9) 
 
1999 162 Russia (58) 
Belarus (14) 
Switzerland (9) 
Algeria (5) 
Hungary (4)  
 
2000 233 Russia (61)  
Switzerland (47)  
France (21)  
Algeria (20) 
Egypt (10)  
 
There have been several alternatives for the processing companies to acquire seeds. 
They have acquired seeds from farms, various traders and firms supplying farms with 
inputs. Many processing companies have operated on “daval’cheskie” terms paying for 
the raw material with sunflower oil they have processed (APK-Inform 2001a; 
Striewe 2001).  
Towards the end of the decade but before the changed pattern of trade the GCC of the 
Ukrainian sunflower looked as follows. The production of seeds was 2.3 million tones 
in 1998. The farms delivered by different channels 1.7 million tones of seeds. The 
deliveries by barter accounted for 54 % of total deliveries, to market 28 %, to workers 
12 % and deliveries to processing companies 6 %.   
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Table 4.2.4. The value of sunflower oil imports to Russia 1996-2000, imports from 
Ukraine and other major importers (Tamozhennaia statistika vneshnei torgovli 
Rossiiskoi federatsii 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000). 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Sunflower 
oil imports 
to Russia 
(million 
USD) 
145 204 144 170 88 
Imports 
from 
Ukraine 
(million 
USD) 
70 17 20 59 62 
Other major 
sources of 
imports 
Argentina 34 
Turkey 10 
Argentina 94 
-Hungary 55 
Argentina 63 
Hungary 37 
Argentina 69 
USA 16 
Argentina 21 
Yugoslavia 3 
 
The traders and input-suppliers having acquired the seed from farms either exported it 
or delivered it to processing companies. One possible pattern has been that traders and 
middlemen had the seeds processed in processing companies in “davalcheskie” terms. 
The dashed arrows in the figure represent sunflower oil flows and the downward arrow 
from processing companies typify the deliveries from processing to traders. The 
suppliers of seeds often opted for exporting the seeds. For example, as much as 40 % of 
the seed production was exported in 1996 and the proportion was approximately 50 % 
in 1997. From the point of view of the farms or whoever was actually selling seeds it 
was more profitable to export than to deliver them to domestic processing companies 
(see Derzhkomstat 2001d). The value of seed exports was 207 million USD and the 
value of oil exports 133 million USD (figure 4.2.1). 
At this stage, the processing industry was not able to find proper ways to adapt to 
competition and diminished purchasing power. The industry, by and large, was not able 
to govern the downscaling. One can argue that traders and input-suppliers governed the 
chain and they were in a better position to acquire seeds because they were able to 
supply the farms with inputs.  
What was their ability to govern the chain based on? It was not based on information 
about consumers’ preferences at retail market, because as much as half of the seeds 
were exported unprocessed. Although they had certain amount of seeds processed for 
the domestic market, their power in the value chain was not based on information about 
retail markets. Therefore, we cannot regard the commodity chain as a buyer driven.  
The ability to govern the chain was based on issues rooted in the inadequacies of the 
Ukrainian economy. First, because farms were unable to receive credits and, 
consequently, to acquire inputs, traders and input suppliers took the advantage of the 
situation by delivering necessary inputs and receiving the harvest. In other words, they 
fulfilled the role of banks in delivering credits and got involved in the marketing of 
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seeds. Second, they were in better position to receive information about prices in the 
market. Third, they were able to overcome the serious inadequacies of the 
infrastructure. Storage, transport and logistics have been based on inefficient 
monopolies (see Striewe 2001). Farms had no experience of organizing these necessary 
functions. The traders have had the means to acquire information and the economic and 
political muscles to deal with the monopolies. The farms would have suffered from 
insufficient income, even if they had been able to acquire credits, because the prices of 
inputs and infrastructure were high. An important reason for the inadequate income to 
farms has been the poor state of marketing infrastructure. As a result, farms have 
received only a modest share of the sales revenue (Sedik 2000; Striewe 2001).  
Although the statistics show high profitability of seed production in the mid-1990s, it 
has been unclear to what extent farms benefited from the favorable situation. On the 
contrary, it is more likely that traders dictated the prices and farms were in an 
unfavorable position. Instead of fair competition among traders, there is information 
that at regional level traders and input suppliers have achieved a monopoly and the entry 
to markets has not been free and even organized crime has been involved in driving 
competitors away (Striewe 2001). There are also reports confirming that regional 
authorities have restricted flows of goods between regions (Sandul 2001).  
 
 
Figure 4.2.1. The Ukrainian GCC of sunflower prior to export tax (1998). 
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Although the regional monopolies have been maintained by harsh and unfair methods, 
the strong position of input suppliers and traders in general has not been based only on 
dubious methods. To act as middlemen in the sunflower seed market has required the 
ability to carry the financial risks because the seeds are received well after the inputs 
have been delivered. Energy and fuel companies have been major players in the market, 
for obvious reasons. Energy companies and other input suppliers have been able to carry 
the risk. Were banking sector able to operate decently, these middlemen would not have 
been needed. At least they would have concentrated on normal transactions with farms, 
not on barter transactions suppressing the farms. It seems to be the case that in a 
transition economy with poorly functioning financial sector the agents in economy with 
access to capital can easily achieve a position in commodity chain where they are able 
to govern the chain (Swinnen & Gow 1999). The position can be very profitable indeed 
because trade margins can be very high, up to 25 % (Striewe 2001).  
Governance by traders is not necessarily a negative thing. If they can do the necessary 
investments, they can improve the efficiency of the chain. They can also assist farms in 
making investments in case farms due to the inadequacies in land legislation and 
banking system are not able to do so. This pattern can be regarded as a financial 
innovation referred to in article by Swinnen & Gow (1999).  
I argue that the sunflower GCC at this stage of development reminds in terms of 
whether it is buyer, producer or international trader driven more the latter than anything 
else. Especially important are the high entry barriers to trading functions. The poorly 
working capital markets hinder the farms to upgrade. The lack of management skills 
further deteriorates the possibilities to organize new functions. Farms are unable to 
invest and organize the functions upwards the value chain: logistics, storage and 
transport (Kononevich 2001). Worse, the farms are dependent on prices set by 
monopolies blocking the entry of newcomers. The existence of monopolies is rooted in 
poorly functioning government unable to establish the rule of law in Ukraine leaving the 
playground open for the strongest. In addition, market information about prices and how 
to organize the value chain are also important and traders are in better position than 
farms to acquire it. One aspect in the high entry barriers is the working capital needed. 
To conclude, the sunflower GCC prior to export tax can be regarded as trader driven 
having a good deal in common with international trader driven chains presented by 
Gibbon. The obvious difference is, of course, that traders are not necessarily 
international but Ukrainian and operate in Ukraine and export mainly Ukrainian goods. 
The reasons why the traders have achieved such position, however, seem to be very 
similar to reasons behind the position of international traders.  
Towards the very end of the 1990s a significant change took place in the sector. 
Processing companies had been in difficult position in the commodity chain. As a rule, 
they were not very efficient in creating value-added in processing and marketing and, 
consequently, were not able to pay sufficient price to farms or other seed suppliers. 
Export was the most attracting option. However, it was obvious that neither government 
nor processing companies were satisfied with the situation when unprocessed seeds 
were exported and domestic processing industry was suffering without sufficient raw-
material for processing. To solve the problems in acquiring raw material and to keep the 
oil processing companies operating, interest groups representing processors lobbied for 
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export duty and succeeded. Ukraine introduced an export duty for sunflower seeds in 
September 1999.  
It is understandable that both the government and the processing industry preferred to 
process seeds in domestic companies. This goal was supported by the belief that 
Ukrainian companies could do it as efficiently as foreign ones (Von Cramon-Taudabel 
& Striewe 2001). Despite the objections by the WB and the IMF (Lissovolik 2001), the 
intensive lobbying resulted in the introduction of an export duty. The decision included 
a promise that the lower price paid to farms by the processing companies would be 
compensated.  
If the benefits of the export duty were so obvious from government and processors’ 
vantage point, why it was not lobbied and implemented before (see APK-Inform 
2001a).  Prior to implementation, at least one important structural change took place. 
The largest sunflower oil processing companies attracted significant amount of FDIs 
and the largest enterprises producing sunflower oil became foreign-owned. The largest 
producer (the Dnepropetrovsk Oil-Extracting Plant, DOEP) as well as the third (Cargill) 
largest producers are foreign owned (APK-Inform 2001a). Cargill built its processing 
plant in summer 1999 and, at the same time in September 1999, the government 
introduced the export duty. The timing can be perceived as a coincidence, but, 
according to several interviews, it certainly was not a coincidence. Rather, foreign 
investors together with domestic processors lobbied for the export tax (Marchenko 
2001; Rudenko 2001).  
Thinking in terms of the GCC, by implementing trade policy measures the government 
created obvious trade policy rents for the processing industry and it was able to upgrade 
its position substantially. The processors were able to become the governors of the 
chain. It happened at the expense of farmers who lost when the domestic prices for 
seeds dropped (Sedik 2000). However, the export tax is considered a success in the 
Department of Food of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy (Sandul 2001; Shevtsov 2001). 
The aim of the tax was achieved. The domestic production of sunflower oil increased 
and the exports of seed decreased. In addition, the export of sunflower oil increased. 
From the point of view of exports an important change took place. The export of oil to 
Russia increased whereas sunflower seed had previously been exported to EU countries. 
The tax resulted in decreased exports to EU countries. 
After the introduction of export tax and increased exports the picture of the Ukrainian 
GCC looked as follows. The seed production was the record high 3.6 million tones in 
2000. The deliveries by farms by different channels – total amount 2.3 million tones – 
had not changed markedly compared to year 1998. Deliveries by barter accounted for 36 
% of production, deliveries to market 47 %, to workers 15 % and to processing 
companies only 2 %. 
No estimates are available at this stage about the “davalcheskie” terms of trade. One can 
reasonably expect that their importance diminished because the processing industry 
attracted significant amount of FDIs and they should have been able to improve their 
position in the value chain. They are, however, still described in the figure. In fact, 
EBRD funded several oil processing plants and one of the reasons was that improve the 
position of farms as well (EBRD 1999a; EBRD 1999b; EBRD 1999c; EBRD 2001; 
Marchenko 2001.  
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Figure 4.2.2. The Ukrainian GCC of sunflower after the export tax. 
 
The tax resulted in oversupply of seeds in the domestic market and prices dropped. The 
processing companies were now in a position where they were able to dictate the prices. 
Ukrainian Agrarian confederation estimated that one year after the implementation of 
the tax the farms’ losses amounted one billion hryvnas (190 million USD) (UAF 2000).   
It is interesting to note that although the production of sunflower oil and exports 
increased and, one would expect, the cash flow to processing industry increased, that 
did not necessarily improve the position of farms because they continued to deliver the 
seeds by barter and to traders.  
Sunflower oil exports increased and Ukraine became the largest importer of sunflower 
oil to Russia. At the same time, the seed exports decreased. The oil was exported both to 
retail market and to further processing. The sunflower oil is exported also by Ukrainian 
as well as international traders and purchased by international traders and Russian food 
processing companies (APK-Inform 2001b). Among the largest purchasers of oil, there 
are, for example, some of the largest margarine producers of Russia. The success in the 
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retail market is based on well-known brands and price. The importance of brands has 
something in common with the buyer driven chains. In case the oil is exported for 
further processing – for producing margarine, for instance – the brand is not important. 
Among the exporters of seeds there are both Ukrainian and international traders. Their 
role in chain governance requires, however, further research.   
It is hard to estimate what is the power of traders and middlemen in the chain inside 
Ukraine after the introduction of export duty. Obviously, it would have been in their 
interest to continue to export seeds without the duty. They still play some role in 
governing the chain, because the amount of seeds delivered straight from farms to 
processing companies is modest. The most obvious shift in chain governance is, of 
course, the increased power of processing companies. They were able to upgrade and to 
improve the conditions of acquiring raw materials. This was achieved because their 
economic and political power increased. Processing industry attracted FDIs and was 
able to lobby for the trade policy rents necessary to upgrade. To achieve the position of 
the governor of the chain requires political power to acquire trade policy rents. 
The Ukrainian GCC after the implementation of export duty has characteristics of 
several of the types of GCC. Part of the production goes to further processing and, 
consequently, certain quality requirements must be met that reminds the buyer driven 
chain. Sunflower oil and seeds are not, however, goods in which we could find 
something similar to the textbook example of buyer driven commodity chain. Rather, 
the sunflower GCC reminds the international trader driven chain. The strong position of 
traders in Ukraine is rooted in the inadequacies of Ukrainian economy. First, the 
financial markets function poorly. Worse, farms are dependent on “financial 
innovations” (Swinnen & Gow 1999) in receiving credits, mainly from the input-
suppliers. Second, the marketing and logistic infrastructure are so inefficient and poorly 
developed that to organize those functions require both political and economic power. 
The inefficiency also diminishes the farm income. In these conditions, traders and 
middlemen have reached the position to govern the chain. They can be in even a better 
position than international traders because they have the social capital and personal 
networks required to successfully carry out transactions in Ukraine. To conclude, it 
seems to be the case for traditional (see Gibbon 2001) agricultural goods produced in 
Ukraine that the international trader driven type of chain is the closest comparison. 
Apart from the characteristics typical of those chains, there are, however, other factors 
enabling the chains to be governed by traders. The factors are rooted in the inadequacies 
of the Ukrainian economy.  
4.3 Grain  
4.3.1 Grain production and processing 
Grain, together with sunflower, has been considered one of the most potentially 
successful sectors of the agro-food sector. Unlike sunflower, however, grain has 
demonstrated the obstacles that a potential successor can face in transition economy. 
The grain production fluctuated in the 1990s but the production in general decreased. 
Large farms still account for the majority of production but their proportion has 
decreased gradually. They accounted for 97 % of the production in 1990 but only 82 % 
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of the production in 2000. The volume of production at household plots has increased 
and is actually quite substantial (4.5 million tones). The yields per hectare have clearly 
decreased. It is important to note that the yields at household plots have been higher 
than at large farms. The sown area has slightly decreased but the proportion of sown 
area used for grain production has remained roughly the same during the 1990s. This 
typifies the farm-level adaptation when the farms opt for the profitable crops and 
continue growing them. Sugar demonstrated the opposite example and the sown area 
under sugar has diminished, because it has not been profitable. 
Compared to sunflower and sugar beet, grain is used for larger amount of purposes. 
Because grain is the basis for numerous value chains and used for various purposes both 
in agriculture and food processing industry, we are unable deal adequately with all the 
value chains. Instead, we focus on the chain governance of grain trade in general. Still, a 
brief review on the food processing industry and the dual structure of food market is 
necessary.  
Table 4.3.1. The production of grain, (million tones), yield/hectare on large farms and 
household plots and sown area (million hectares) in Ukraine 1990-2000 (Derzhkomstat 
2001c).  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Production, 
of which  
51.0 38.7 38.5 45.6 35.5 33.9 24.6 35.5 26.5 24.6 24.5 
Large farms 
 
49.6 37.2 36.8 43.0 33.1 31.1 22.0 32.1 23.8 21.6 20.0 
Household 
plots 
 
1.4 1.4 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.5 3.4 2.7 3.0 4.5 
Yield on 
average 
 
35.1 26.5 27.9 32.1 26.8 24.3 19.6 24.5 20.8 19.7 19.4 
Yield on 
large farms 
35.1 26.4 27.8 31.9 26.7 24.0 19.3 24.1 20.4 19.2 18.3 
Yield on 
house-hold 
plots 
35.8 32.3 31.0 34.8 27.6 28.0 23.9 29.0 24.5 24.8 26.9 
Sown area 
 
14.5 14.6 13.8 14.2 13.2 14.0 12.5 14.5 12.8 12.5 12.6 
 
Table 4.3.2 demonstrates that the production of bread in the processing industry has 
decreased to approximately one third, the production of flour to less than a half and the 
production of pasta to one third. At the same time, we see that the consumption of those 
goods has decreased approximately 10 %, a negligible decrease compared to the 
decrease of production. Apparently, there are several explanations. First, these goods 
are used more efficiently and the consumption matches quite well with production. 
Second, bread is not used as fodder. The dual structure of the food market can be found 
here as well. Obviously, there are flows of these goods produced outside the processing 
industry reaching consumption.  
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Table 4.3.2. The production of bread, flour and pasta 1990, 1995-1996, 1998-2000, 
production per capita 2000 and production in 2000 compared to 1990 in Ukraine 
(Derzhkomstat 2001a).  
 1990 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 Production 
per capita, 
2000, kilos 
Production 
2000 
compared to 
1990 
Bread 6701 4114 3452 2676 2505 2461 49.7 36.7 
Flour 7671 5319 4965 3890 3354 n.a. 62.0 43.7* 
Pasta 360 223 172 165 154 116 2.3 32.2 
 
Table 4.3.3. The consumption (kilos per capita) of bread, cereals and pasta in 1990, 
1995, 1998-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001a). 
 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 
Bread, cereals 
and pasta 
141 128 126 122 123 
4.3.2 Grain exports 
There has been no obvious trend in the value of grain exports in second half of the 
1990s. The volume and value of exports have varied in an unexpected way. A small 
harvest has resulted in an increase in exports and a large harvest in the reverse. The 
value of exports reached a peak in 1999, the value being 473 million USD. The same 
year the harvest was the lowest in the 1990s. On the other hand, when the harvest in 
1997 was the largest in the late 1990s, the exports were at their lowest. Admittedly, a 
good harvest can result in an increase in exports at the beginning of the following year. 
However, the harvest was low both in 1998 and 1999 while exports reached a peak in 
1999. The trend in exports demonstrates the importance of domestic enterprise 
structures and the role of the government regulation in promoting or reducing trade, i.e. 
chain governance. 
The CIS countries accounted for approximately a half of the grain exports of Ukraine in 
1996. Since then their proportion has decreased. Some new destinations are obvious tax 
havens, such as Bermuda and the Virgin Islands. Geographically most of the countries 
mentioned in the table are quite easily accessible to Ukraine including Cyprus, Israel, 
Belarus and Hungary. The Ukraine has thus been able to find new export markets to 
replace the CIS countries, although Belarus has been among the five largest export 
destinations. 
Despite the favourable conditions for growing grain, numerous factors make exporting 
difficult (see Striewe 2001). One obvious factor hindering free exporting is the 
inadequate infrastructure required for storage and transportation. Second, the 
government has sought to regulate the grain trade and exports. These issues closely 
related to chain governance and upgrading will be studied more thoroughly below.  
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Table 4.3.4. The export of grain in 1996-2000 and the five most important export 
destinations each year (Derzhavnii komitet statistiki 2001b). 
 The value of grain exports 
(million USD)  
The 5 largest export destinations,  
(million USD) 
1996 329 Belarus (58)  
Turkmenistan (54)  
Poland (49)  
Russia (47) 
Israel (18)  
1997 112 Belarus (27)  
Slovakia (18) 
Saudi Arabia (12)  
Israel (9)  
Cyprus (5) 
1998 253 Israel (40)  
South Korea (29)  
Bermuda (28)  
UK (28)  
British Virgin Islands (19)  
1999 473 Belarus (70) 
Israel (64) 
Turkey (42) 
Hungary (42) 
UK (24) 
2000 104 Syria (16)  
Cyprus (12)  
Belarus (11)  
Saudi Arabia (10)  
Switzerland (9) 
 
4.3.3 GCC and grain 
During the Soviet time, the value chain was based on specialization. The task of the 
farms was to produce grain; other tasks and functions of the value chain were beyond 
their competence. They received necessary inputs and sought to fulfil the plans. Other 
organizations were responsible for storage, transport and processing (Striewe 2001). 
The elevators for storage and processing were huge requiring large amounts of grain. 
Often, the farms of certain regions delivered grain to one particular elevator. In other 
words, the value chain of grain resembled closely its counterparts in other the sub-
sectors of the food processing industry. In addition, there was no infrastructure for grain 
exports, because grain was not exported. The existing infrastructure of the value chain 
was far from optimal in terms location. For example, storage capacity was located quite 
far from the majority of farms. 
Compared to sugar and sunflower, the value chain of grain is more fragmented because 
of the numerous purposes grain is used. The table below demonstrates the purposes of 
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grain use and the distribution. A significant amount of the total supply is used as fodder 
meaning that it may never leave the farm. Seeds are also used in the farms. Therefore, 
the deliveries of grain from farms are much less than the production.  
The pattern of deliveries of grain from the large farms has followed the same path with 
other goods analysed but was slightly more fragmented already in 1990. Of the grain 
produced by large farms in 1990, 81 % was delivered to processing companies, 13 % to 
workers, 3 % to market and 3 % by other channels. The pattern changed in the first half 
of the 1990s quite substantially. In 1995, only 37 % of the grain delivered was delivered 
to processing companies. At the same time, 13 % was delivered by barter, 30 % to 
workers and 20 % to markets (Derzhkomstat 2001d).  
The fragmentation of deliveries continued and in 2000 the distribution was as follows. 
Of total deliveries, 25 % was delivered by barter, 35 % to workers, 36 % to market and 
only 4 % to processing companies. Of course, the very modest amount of grain 
delivered does not mean that only 4 % of the grain was processed. Instead, grain reaches 
processing by other channels. Unlike in other sections, there is no figure about the 
distribution of grain deliveries because grain is used for numerous purposes and 
sufficient information about the flows of goods has not been available. Still, we can 
make some observations. Compared to deliveries of sunflower, we see at least two 
important differences. First, the amount of grain delivered to workers is much higher. 
Second, the proportions delivered either by barter or to markets – obviously meaning 
also deliveries to traders – are high. Also, the grain is used as fodder to feed the 
increased number of animals at household plots. Moreover, the government has been 
deeply involved in grain procurements. The state and regional authorities have been 
more active in grain market than in sunflower (Striewe 2001). Grain has traditionally 
considered critical to food security and authorities have sought to guarantee large stocks 
to ensure food supply. They have also retained the control of infrastructure. 
When the privatization started in the early 1990s, the Ukrainian government was 
intended to create a holding company to control elevators, processing facilities and 
bakeries. To create one holding company controlling the facilities did not succeed and 
the regional administrations were able to acquire the control of these facilities. Hence, 
regional administrations became major governors of the value chain.  
Further, certain practises of delivering agricultural support resulted in the involvement 
of regional administration in the grain market. They were made responsible for 
controlling the payments for inputs and to ensure the payments they restricted the flows 
of goods outside their region. All these above-mentioned issues had their impact on the 
chain governance. Large farms were in an unfavourable position because they were 
often dependent on the monopolies in delivering their goods. Moreover, regional 
administrations were able to dictate to whom and by what prices farms had to deliver 
their produce.    
One serious weakness of the reforms has been that several critical functions of the grain 
value chain were not privatised and farms have been dependent on these (often) 
monopolies in transport, storage and processing of grain. For example, Ukragrotrans 
continued to control road transport facilities and, similarly, the Ukrainian railways hold 
a monopoly over railways (Striewe 2001). Perhaps the most serious obstacle of exports 
have been, however, the inadequate and mismanaged port facilities.  
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Table 4.3.5. The supply and distribution of grain for different purposes in Ukraine in 
1999/2000 (APK-Inform 2001b).  
 1000 tonnes 
Stocks at the beginning of year 2416 
Production 26560 
Import 564 
Supply, total 29540 
Export 3202 
Fodder 11340 
Processing in food processing industry 8502 
Other industrial use 696 
Seeds 3083 
Losses 886 
Consumption at domestic market, total 24506 
Stocks at the end of the year 1832 
Stocks, % of domestic consumption 7.5 
 
In 1997, the efforts to establish more state control on the grain value finally succeeded 
and approximately hundred important enterprises were acquired by the Khlib Ukrainy, 
the state-owned holding company. It has had a clear government mandate to make a 
profit in the grain market and has been in a privileged position in terms of budget 
funding. Although it is difficult to get reliable information about the actual means it has 
used to dominate, it is obvious that there have not been equal opportunities in the grain 
market. There are conflicting opinions about its impact on fair competition. The 
government officials do not regard its position as problematic, but international 
organizations claim that it obstructed fair competition (Shevtsov 2001; Kaliberda 2001). 
It has been estimated that it controlled at least 20 % of grain processing capacity in the 
late 1990s. Moreover, it has been in a privileged position in terms of access to capital 
because it has been funded from the state budget. However, its financial position has not 
been good (Pirani 2002). 
Apart from the intervention by state and regional authorities, another major problem in 
the grain commodity chain has been the serious inefficiency of the chain (Kompanets 
2001; Striewe 2001). The table below demonstrates the costs and losses in Ukrainian 
grain production and distribution. The corresponding figures for Germany are presented 
for comparison. It is easy to notice the remarkable difference in terms of efficiency. 
Ukrainian grain commodity chain is substantially more inefficient in all stages of the 
commodity chain and, consequently, the income to farms is substantially lower (see also 
Sedik 2000). This state of affairs obviously calls for chain governance to make the chain 
operate more efficiently. Moreover, it calls for upgrading requiring investments. To 
upgrade and to take control of these functions would have been an obvious task for 
farms, but they have been unable to make the necessary investment, for the reasons 
explained in the third section. 
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Table 4.3.6. Costs and losses in Ukrainian and German grain production and 
distribution (all figures in percent) (Striewe 2001).  
 Ukraine Germany 
Harvest losses 7.0 2.0 
On-farm losses (Storage, Transport) 6.5 1.0 
Transport losses 1.7 1.0 
Total storage costs in elevators 12.0 6.5 
Storage losses in elevators 2.2 0.2 
Handling, Rail and River 4.0 3.0 
Transport losses, rail and ship 0.7 0.0 
Transport Costs (Ukraine: rail, Germany: 
ship 
3.0 3.0 
Handling, Seaports 10.4 5.8 
Trade Margin  10.4 4.9 
Revenues for agricultural enterprises 40.5 72.4 
 
Because farms have been unable to govern the chain and upgrade, other organizations 
have emerged to govern the value chain of grain processing and exports. One model of 
the chain governance in the grain market looks as follows. For example, there is a 
private holding company trading and exporting grain. The grain trading is not the only 
activity that the company is involved in. They may, for example, trade oil, fertilizers or 
even produce those goods. The initial connection to agriculture has often been 
established through input supplies. 
The figure below demonstrates one model of the chain governance in the grain market. 
Holding company controls several large farms and their land. Officially the farms are 
subsidiaries of the holding company. This form of ownership has been chosen because it 
makes withdrawing easier if the farms fail. Holding companies make forward contracts 
with farms about buying the harvest and supplying them with fuels and fertilizers, 
obviously dictating the prices. The holding company organizes the storage and transport 
and sells the grain to the elevator in the port. Other firms organize export (Biba & 
Supikhanov 2001).  
The practices involved in grain export stress the unequal competition in the grain 
market. As von Cramon-Taudabel and Zorya (2000) point out, there are bureaucratic 
procedures which can be used to hinder exports. It is obvious that bureaucratic 
procedures, demanding export licences, for example, can be used to establish unequal 
opportunities for potential exporters. There were a period when the state required 
certain exports licenses from the grain exporters. Apparently, the state company Khlib 
Ukrainy has been in a privileged position to deal with the bureaucracy.  
To ensure the export income or income from the domestic market, it is necessary to 
control the infrastructure connecting farms with the export or domestic market as 
completely as possible. Also, one must be able to deal with the bureaucracy (Biba & 
Supikhanov 2001). This stresses the importance of certain assets to be able to govern 
the chain. The strong position of the holding companies is based on several factors.  
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Figure 4.3.1 The chain governance of grain trade in Ukraine (Biba & Supikhanov 2001) 
 
First, they have access to capital and they are able to arrange the funding of sowing and 
harvesting. Second, it is able to organize storage, transport and logistics. One must bear 
in mind that these functions are often based on monopolies and social networks and 
political and economic power assist in dealing with them. Another alternative, to 
establish or acquire new infrastructure for storage and transport requires investments. In 
addition, an accumulated knowledge about markets is also required to be able to govern 
the chain.  
New infrastructure increased their importance in the late 1990s. Traders and other 
private companies either acquired existing storage facilities and elevators or invested in 
new ones. These companies were initially either from outside agro-food sector or 
processing companies. Aside with the huge and often state-owned existing elevators – 
which were seriously lagging technically – new elevators and storage facilities emerged 
(Kononevich 2001). They were better equipped and served better the interests of those 
processing companies that required high quality raw material. The huge state-owned 
elevators were mostly operating by “daval`cheskie’ terms. Those companies that have 
invested in elevators and storage facilities are often investing in agriculture as well 
(Kononevich 2001; Olimpeks 2001). In other words, they seek to govern the chain as 
completely as possibly. Those companies can operate either in the domestic or both 
domestic and export markets. Towards the end of the 1990s large international traders 
increased their activities in Ukraine (Pirani 2002).  
We see quite easily that the grain market is not a buyer driven. The competition is not 
primarily based on the quality but, instead, on price. The grain value chain resembles 
more the international trader driven chain and towards the end of the decade, an 
increasing number of international traders started to operate in Ukraine. The traders 
clearly are the agents governing the chain. 
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The access to capital and accumulated knowledge about markets are the reasons why 
the traders have been able to govern the chain. Still, there are some other reasons 
resulting in the trader driven chain. They are rooted in the overall operating 
environment and, in particular, the inadequacies of the Ukrainian economy. First of all, 
to deal with the monopolies controlling infrastructure both social networks and 
economic and political power are required. In other words, the chain governance 
requires assets, which are connected to the agro-food value chain itself but also to the 
operating environment in general. To establish new facilities requires that company 
possesses capital or is able to acquire it without functioning banking sector. 
Also, we perceive a picture where the relationship between the domestic traders and the 
farms resembles closely the relationship between farms and international traders. The 
chain governance carried out by domestic traders is based on similar assets with the 
international traders although the chain exists within one country.  
4.4 Milk and Dairy Industry 
4.4.1 Milk production 
Milk production and dairy industry differ from other value chains studied above. They 
are predominantly oriented to domestic market. This chapter is an effort to introduce the 
GCC approach or, at least, some concepts of the GCC approach to a predominantly 
domestic-oriented value chain. As was argued in the second section, some key concepts 
of the GCC approach could be used to analyze the dynamics of the value chain within 
one country. In the value chains studied above, the large farms still dominate in primary 
production whereas in milk production household plots account for the majority of 
primary production. Therefore, it offers a case to analyze in which chain governance has 
to find the strategy to adapt to fundamentally altered conditions in input supplies.   
During the Soviet period, 77 % of the milk was produced at large farms. They delivered 
their produce to processing units, which, in turn, delivered processed goods to 
consumers. Household plots produced for themselves and local markets, but not for 
processing. The functioning of the chain was based on large volumes in all stages of the 
chain, soft budget constraints and ample subsidizes to agriculture. In addition, the 
processing industry did not meet competition at the retail market. On the contrary, 
consumers were competing for the goods produced. Consequently, neither the 
processing industry nor retail trade were relying on the information of the requirements 
of the market and consumers’ preferences in decision-making about what to produce 
and what to require from the farms supplying them with inputs.   
During the Soviet period, household plots accounted for 23 % of milk produced. The 
milk was consumed by the producers or was sold at local market. During the 1990s, a 
significant change took place. The household plots accounted for 71 % of the milk 
produced in 2000 the large farms accounting for the remaining 29 %. The change was 
gradual as the table below demonstrates (Derzhkomstat 2001c).  
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Table 4.4.1. The total milk production (million tonnes) and the proportion of large 
farms (LF) and household plots (HP) in Ukraine 1990-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001c; 
Derzhkomstat 2001d). 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total 
production 
24.5 22.4 19.1 18.4 18.1 17.3 15.8 13.8 13.8 13.4 12.7 
LF, total 
production 
18.6 16.5 13.0 11.7 10.9 9.4 7.7 5.4 5.3 4.7 3.7 
LF, total 
deliveries 
18.0 15.6 n.a n.a n.a 6.8 n.a n.a. 3.6 3.2 2.7 
LF, share in 
total 
production 
76 74 68 64 60 54 48 39 38 35 29 
HP, total 
production 
5.9 5.9 6.1 6.7 7.2 7.8 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.6 9.0 
HP, share in 
total 
production 
24 26 32 36 40 46 52 61 62 65 71 
 
The production of milk and milk production in processing industry decreased 
dramatically in the 1990s. The total production of milk products in 2000 was only 10 % 
compared to production in 1990. We should bear in mind, however, that the 
consumption of milk did not decrease that much. The consumption of milk and milk 
products was 373 kilos in 1990. In 2000, the consumption was 198 kilos, a little more 
than half of the consumption in 1990. Still, consumption has decreased much less than 
the production of processed milk products. It means that there certainly is a dual 
structured market of milk and milk products. Apart from the goods produced in the 
processing industry, there have been a lot of unprocessed dairy goods as substitutes 
available. Also, the large amount of production at household plots accounts for a 
substantial share of milk consumption without the milk ever entering retail sales or 
market places. For example, of the 42 kilos of milk consumed (per capita) in Ukraine in 
2000 only 4 litres was packed (Kovalenko 2001).  
 
Table 4.4.2. The production of the most important dairy goods (thousand tones) in 
Ukraine 1990, 1995 and 1998-2000 (Derzhkomstat 2001a). 
 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 
Milk products 6432 1293 691 700 699 
Sour milk goods, of which 380 116 119 137 158 
-Yogurt - - 6  10 18 
-Sour cream 476 77 40 42 45 
Milk powder 61 21 8 9 11 
Cheese 184 74 52 53 67 
Butter 444 222 113 109 135 
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Only a limited amount of people has been able to purchase the goods processed in the 
industry and the processing companies have competed with imports at diminished 
market. As a result, the previous amounts produced at processing industry appeared to 
be too large and, consequently, the previous amounts of raw materials appeared to be 
too much. Hence, the production by large farms decreased because previous amounts of 
milk were no longer required for processing. Household plots have been more 
competitive at the market places where unprocessed goods are sold than large farms, 
which in principle have equal opportunities to compete there. The structural change 
faced by the dairy sector has been so fundamental and many agents of the chain have 
found it hard to adapt. Chain governance has indeed been needed to adapt the entire 
value chain to meet the requirements of changed conditions.   
4.4.2 GCC and dairy sector 
When the economic reforms began in 1992, they had an immediate impact on the entire 
dairy value chain. Several important changes can be listed. First, the food market 
opened up for competition. The simple supplying consumers with dairy products was 
not enough to succeed in the new conditions. The food processing companies did not 
posses the critical asset, on which the position of retailers and food-processing 
enterprises as the governors of the chain is based elsewhere, i.e. information about the 
requirements of the market. Moreover, they had no experience of operating in the 
market. The foreign companies entering the market were used to acquire information 
about the requirements of the new markets and consumers were willing to try new 
produce having just entered the market. Both factors had adverse impact on the 
competitive position of Ukrainian milk and dairy value chain. Second, purchasing 
power decreased. Meat and dairy goods have been highly income elastic. When incomes 
have decreased, consumers have bought less meat and dairy goods. The chain has been 
obliged to cope with a diminished demand to processed goods. Third, the public support 
was cut dramatically. 
To be able to construct a structured view of the milk value chain we need to know the 
structure of the deliveries. Concerning the deliveries from large farms, statistics exist, 
but concerning deliveries from household plots we must rely on estimates. In 1990, 
virtually all milk produced (99 %) by large farms was delivered to milk processing 
industry; processed there and distributed through retail sales. That was the primary flow 
of milk in the value chain. The secondary flow of milk came from household plots to 
market places (see figure 4.4.1).  
The amount of milk produced and delivered by large farms decreased steadily 
throughout the 1990s. The share of milk delivered to processing industry has remained 
the largest channel throughout the 1990s but alternative channels have increased their 
shares. For example, deliveries to processing industry accounted for 87 % of the total 
deliveries in 1995. At the same time, deliveries to market(places) accounted for 9 % of 
the total deliveries and other channels of deliveries – to workers instead of salary and 
barter – accounted for 2 % and 2 % respectively. Towards the end of the decade the 
total amount of milk deliveries continued to decrease and so did the deliveries to 
processing industry and market(place) as well as deliveries to workers and barter. In 
2000, the shares of channels of deliveries looked as follows. The deliveries to 
processing industry accounted for 66 %, to market place 21 %, deliveries to workers 8 
% and barter 5 %.  
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Figure 4.4.1. The milk GCC during Soviet time 
The production of milk products by the dairy industry has decreased significantly and is 
only approximately 10 % compared to production in 1990. The deliveries of milk from 
large farms to processing industry were 17 million tones in 1990 but only 1.7 tones in 
2000. The deliveries have decreased approximately as much as the output of processed 
goods.  
Even though the amount of milk delivered to processing industry matches quite well 
with the amount of processed goods, there is information that household plots also 
supply dairy industry with milk and that they actually play a significant role in 
producing raw material for the dairy industry. According to estimates, they account for 
even 50 % of the raw material supplies for the dairy industry (Boltina 2001). As long as 
we do not have exact information about the milk supplies to dairy industry we should 
base our analysis on estimates, which seem to create an unclear picture of the deliveries. 
For example, it is likely that large farms acquire milk from household plots and sell it 
further to industry. This could explain the high estimates about the household plots’ 
proportion in supplies.  
Figure 4.4.2 represents the situation in the dairy sector in general. There is not 
necessarily any governance in separate value chains. Many value chains have unable to 
adapt to meet the changed requirements of the changed market. Some dairy enterprises 
have been, however, able to govern the chain. Such situation will be studied below.  
Household plots have survived better, on average. They have been able to increase their 
production. Moreover, they have in some cases been able to increase their sells at 
market places and even become raw material suppliers of the processing industry.   
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Figure 4.4.2. The GCC of Ukrainian dairy industry  
The increased proportion of milk production at household plots and its use for dairy 
industry’s raw material supply is an interesting case demonstrating the adaptation of the 
value chain in altered conditions and, more importantly, how the adaptation has been 
governed. One must bear in mind that there was no infrastructure connecting household 
plots and dairy industry. The milk value chain requires certain equipment to sustain the 
quality of milk during transportation, for example. The value chain of the milk and dairy 
production during the Soviet period was based on large farms. The adaptation has 
altered not only the acquiring of raw material, but the conditions in which the entire 
chain operates.  
There have been certain requirements and aims for successful chain governance. 
Obviously, the production volume of the entire value-chain should have been 
downscaled which is hard to implement without sound governance. The dairy industry 
has been in a key position when solving the problems of the entire milk processing 
chain. Success and survival of dairy enterprises have required a total change in their 
strategies (Boltina 2001; Kovalenko 2001; Vintonjak 2001). In the beginning of 1990s, 
the dairy enterprises had no experience in operating in market conditions. Everything 
they produced was hoarded without any marketing effort and they enjoyed a guaranteed 
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raw material supply. In the industry itself, profitability and efficiency were not their 
primary goals. Instead, to fulfill the plan was the main imperative.   
Since the beginning of the market reforms, food industry has encountered several 
changes. To govern the entire chain has become a necessity for several reasons. The 
necessity of governance has included both upward and downward linkages and the 
industry itself. The food processing industry has not needed the previous amounts of 
milk for processing since the purchasing power of the consumers has decreased and, 
consequently, the volume of market for their produce has decreased. In the course of the 
1990s, the ability of the agricultural sector to produce a sufficient amount of raw 
material for the food processing industry was deteriorated, and the food processing 
industry has had difficulties in acquiring raw materials, especially in terms of quality.  
The leading dairy enterprises have all been obliged to pay attention in raw material 
supplies either by directly investing to (large or small) farms or otherwise assisting them 
in acquiring equipment. For example, Galakton – the leader in Ukrainian dairy industry 
– encourages farmers to produce better milk by paying them dependently on the quality 
of milk. It has a special unit for taking care of the quality of milk. Galakton has also put 
great effort in marketing and creating brands etc.. In other words, to become the leading 
dairy enterprise, Galakton has been obliged to govern the entire value-added chain. One 
reason behind its success has been that it has able to produce what consumers have been 
willing to purchase, i.e. it has possessed the information about the requirements of the 
market. More importantly, it has been able to organize a functioning and efficient value-
added chain including high quality raw material supplies. It has been able to assist the 
other parts of the value chain, especially farms, in reaching the quality it requires. The 
main reason for that has been that it controls the cash flow and receives its income in 
cash, an important asset in otherwise barter dominated economy (Boltina 2001).  
The dairy industry has been able to acquire valuable material about consumers’ 
preferences. New products have been launched for consumers, yogurt being the best 
example. However, the buyer-driven framework stressing the importance of the 
information about the requirements of the markets is clearly not enough to explain why 
the dairy industry has become the one governing the chain. To establish a successful 
value-chain obviously requires more than just information about markets. To meet the 
demands of the market – high quality production – requires high quality raw material 
supply and, in turn, investments, which the farms are not able to make. Therefore, the 
dairy industry’s assets in being able to govern the chain have also something in common 
with international traders possessing adequate financial resources.  
To conclude, the milk and dairy value chain seems to have a lot in common with buyer-
driven type but the information the industry certainly possesses better than farms is not 
enough to explain its strong position. The importance of cash flow enabling necessary 
investment resembles Gibbon’s argumentation about international traders concerning 
the factors in which their ability to govern the chain is based.  
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Figure 4.4.3. The governed milk and dairy value chain.   
 
Some notes about the GCC approach in studying development inside one country are 
necessary. Dolan and Tewari argued that, first, differences in quality requirements in 
domestic and foreign market necessitate chain governance. Second, inability to meet the 
quality requirements of the markets necessitates chain governance. Third reason for the 
governance is the risk of poor supplier performance. Concerning the first point I argue 
that similar differences in possessing information on markets can exist even inside one 
country. One must bear in mind that we are studying a country where no market existed 
twelve years ago. Although the retail market is domestic, farms may still be unaware 
about the requirements and, therefore, unable to meet the requirements. Argumentation 
about the asymmetric information causing buyer-driven chain is true not only in foreign 
trade but also inside one country. There are markets of different requirements and to 
meet the requirements of the advanced, higher requirement market, the chain 
governance is required.  
To sum up, the milk and dairy value chain proves that the concepts of the GCC 
approach originally introduced to study international trade are useful in explaining the 
dynamics of a value chain in one country. Further, the buyer-driven/producer-driven 
dichotomy should be extended to match better the conditions of Ukraine. Especially 
important seems to be the cash flow enabling the processing industry to assist farms in 
meeting the requirements for raw material. Also, the dairy industry attracts investments 
outside the chain – from banks, for instance – and redistributes resources to agriculture.  
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5 Conclusions and Discussion 
5.1 Conclusions 
The dimensions of the structural changes of the Ukrainian agro-food sector have been 
numerous in the 1990s and one study is unable to deal adequately with all of them. 
Therefore, this study set out to focus on the Ukrainian agro-food from the vantage point 
of the global commodity chain (GCC) approach. In addition, the study restricted its 
focus on the first nine years of independence, i.e. 1992-2000 and, in particular, on the 
second half of the 1990s. The year 2000 can be regarded as the starting point of a new 
period in the Ukrainian agro-food sector but such observation comes to the focus only if 
the analysis of the period before the recovery is considered.  
The introduction of this study set out certain tasks. First, to describe thefundamentals of 
the development of Ukrainian agro-food sector. Second, to introduce the GCC approach 
to study the agro-food sector of the FSU countries. And third, to contribute to the 
discussion of the GCC approach. 
The GCC approach has previously been used to study the agro-food sectors of 
developing countries, which have certain similarities but also differences with the FSU 
countries. In the 1990s, Ukraine was obliged to open up its market and integrate its 
agro-food sector into the global agro-food markets. It encountered the same challenges 
of the world agro-food market like any other country. The starting point was, however, 
totally different. During the Soviet time the agro-food value chain was based on large 
volumes and production units in all stages of the chain. It has been described as plan 
driven in this study. In other words, none of the agents of the chain was governing the 
chain because the planning organizations governed. In addition, there was no experience 
of operating outside the FSU.  
The production of agriculture decreased to approximately a half in the 1990s. An 
important reason for that was the decreased public support. The major structural change 
in agriculture was the decreased production at large farms and, consequently, the 
increased share of household plots. Their production increased slightly. The livestock 
sector at large farms was hit hardest. The decreased production of agriculture – and food 
processing industry – could have been regarded as successful adaptation because the 
demand at the retail market decreased. The adaptation was not, however, successful. 
The farms became heavily indebted, were unable to use the necessary inputs and 
became dependent on traders and input-suppliers. The farms were obliged to deliver a 
substantial part of their production to them and, what is more important, in terms that 
did not benefit farms. One important reason for the unfavorable position of farms in the 
value chain was that they were not able to use land as a collateral because the legislation 
prohibited it. Of course, that was not the only reason. Large farms could not, by and 
large, find proper ways to adapt in the changed environment. They were used to operate 
in a stabile environment with ample subsidizes, inputs and, the most important, 
guaranteed demand for their produce. The understanding of the requirements of market 
and market economy in general were lacking and management skills did not enable 
successful adaptation. The lack of knowledge of the requirements of the markets has 
been regarded as one reason for chain governance in previous studies. Hence, the 
development of agro-food sector and the inadequate knowledge at the farm level in 
 73
Ukraine seems to be in line with these arguments, although the previous studies 
investigated international trade. The chain governance occurred because the farms have 
not possessed the necessary knowledge and experience about markets. Also, they were 
unable to receive loans to make the required investment to adapt because they did not 
possess the required assets: collaterals and management skills. Farms have been 
dependent on the other agents of the value chain, which started to govern the chain.  
The food processing industry also found it hard to adapt to market economy. The 
diminished purchaing power resulted in the diminished demand for processed food and, 
as a result, the processing industry has had ample excess capacity, which had to be 
downscaled. Moreover, it had to learn to take the consumers’ preferences into account 
and to compete with imported food at the retail market.  
One of the conclusions of this report is that a dual food market emerged in the 1990s 
and especially the traditional value chain – large farms, large processing companies and 
retail trde – found it very hard to adapt. The dual structured food market consists of, 
first, retail market selling processed goods, both imported and domestic. Second, there 
are marketplaces selling unprocessed goods. Also, a substantial share of consumption 
never enters the market because household plots produce both for the owners of the 
plots as well as their relatives. The diminished purchasing power, the emerged dual 
structure of the food market and in some cases ceased exports have necessitated the 
adaptation but not all value chains have been able to adapt. Successful governance has 
been required. Certain value chains have been able to adapt to changed conditions. In 
most of the cases the food processing enterprise has been the agent that has been able to 
govern the chain and the adaptation process. The adaptation has required investments, 
successful marketing and fulfilling quality requirements. Also, the correct scale of the 
production has been important.  
At the farm level, the household plots have succeeded better than large farms. They had 
functioning, although primitive, marketing channels already during the Soviet time and 
they have been able to govern their own value chain including production and selling 
and – sometimes – primitive processing. Concerning household plots, however, to 
become a part of the food processing value chain has required investments and chain 
governance by the food processing industry as the dairy industry typified. One 
important reason for the strong position of the processing industry and its ability to 
govern the adaptation has been the cash flow from retail sales. The agro-food sector 
demonstrates the importance of the access to capital as a precondition and important 
asset enabling the chain governance. The dairy sector also demonstrates that the 
information about the food market is important but by far not the only precondition for 
chain governance. Obviously, there have been marked differences between the sub-
sectors of the food processing industry. Meat processing has been hit hard because the 
amount of consumers able to pay for processed meat has been limited and household 
plots have supplied market with unprocessed meat.    
The second task set out for this report was to ascertain whether the GCC approach could 
be used to study the agro-food sectors of the FSU countries. I argue that the GCC 
approach proved to be a suitable analytical framework for that purpose. First, we were 
able to analyze the possibilities of the individual agents of the chain: farms and 
processing industry in particular. Moreover, the GCC approach also offered a 
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framework to study individual sub-sectors, i.e. sugar, sunflower, grain and dairy. In 
other words, the scale of the analysis proved to be correct and fruitful.  
I argue that the GCC approach can be used to study value chains within one country 
although the word global is not necessarily needed in that case. Some concepts of the 
GCC assume that the value chain is a cross border one but similar structures can be 
found inside one country as well. For example, Dolan and Tewari (2001) listed cases 
when chain governance can occur. One case was that agricultural producers do not 
possess the information about the requirements of the foreign market. In Ukraine, 
however, we perceived a picture where the large farms have not possessed the 
information about the requirements of the market, the main reason being that they have 
never operated in the market. Therefore, distance and the location of the market in 
another country are not the only explaining factors.  
The general assumption about agro-food value chains has been that they are buyer 
driven. This assumption is, however, based on a limited amount of case studies. This 
study sought to contribute to this discussion. The conclusions made concerning the four 
goods analyzed seem to be in line with Gibbon’s arguments about whether the 
perception of agro-food value chains as buyer driven can be generalized to include the 
entire sector. The sub-sectors and value chain studied here cannot be considered buyer 
driven and, consequently, the agro-food sector as a whole cannot be regarded as buyer 
driven. Hence, this study supports Gibbon’s arguments. The dairy sub-sector has some 
common characteristics with the horticulture chains studied by Dolan and Humphrey, 
but there are significant differences as well. The other three case studies resemble 
international buyer driven chains although they can be located inside Ukraine. 
Of the most important sub-sectors, sugar performed less successfully. Until 1997, 
Ukraine exported large amounts of sugar to Russia. After that, the exports ceased 
because Ukraine was not able to compete in the Russian sugar market. Russia opted for 
cheaper alternatives, first of all, sugar cane imports from Cuba and Brazil. The buyer 
driven chains stress the importance of quality requirements rather than price in 
competition. The sugar sub-sector clearly demonstrates that there are goods in which 
price dictates the success and where other requirements such as quality have only 
secondary importance. Therefore, sugar cannot be regarded as buyer driven chain but, 
instead, resembles international trader driven chains. Russian traders were able to find 
cheaper substitutes to replace imports from Ukraine because the competition was based 
on price and Ukraine failed to compete. Russia created trade policy rents to competitors 
and Ukrainian value chain was left without assets to compete successfully.  
The sunflower has been the most successful sub-sector. Although the development of 
the sector has been quite favorable and profitable, a closer look at the dynamics of the 
value chain revealed that the position of the farms has not necessarily been that 
favorable. Farms became dependent on traders and input-suppliers that governed the 
chain. There were several decisive assets enabling governance. First, they have access 
to capital and they can supply the farms with necessary inputs. Second, they have the 
necessary social networks, economic and political power to organize the functioning 
value chain in which many critical parts have been controlled by monopolies. Third, 
trading firms have accumulated knowledge about markets. The chain governed and 
controlled by traders cannot be considered as buyer driven. Instead, it resembles closely 
international trader driven chains based on Gibbon’s studies. The sunflower sub-sector 
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also demonstrates how a successful upgrading takes place. Until 1999, Ukraine exported 
mainly sunflower seeds and the traders had the assets to control the chain. The 
processing industry lobbied for the export tax and succeeded. In 1999, Ukraine 
introduced an export duty and it boosted domestic processing. Ukraine started to export 
more sunflower oil. In other words, the Ukrainian government created critical trade 
policy rents for industry and enabled the upgrading. The critical asset that enabled the 
upgrading was the political and economic influence on decision makers. The change did 
not however improve the position of the farms. They had not been able to create assets 
to improve their position in the value chain.    
The grain sub-sector resembles sunflower in terms of the position of the farms. They 
have been dependent on traders and input-suppliers. One important difference, however, 
existed. The state intervened on the grain market whereas the sunflower market 
remained mostly intact until 1999. The traders in the grain sector also demonstrate the 
importance of access to capital and the ability to organize certain critical functions in 
the value chain, including storage and logistics. In the grain market there has been a 
situation in which the state has created assets for one of the agents, i.e. state-owned 
trading company Khlib Ukraini.   
To conclude, the Ukrainian agro-food sector encountered a difficult transformation in 
the 1990s. The agents of the chain were not, however, in equal positions when they 
sought to adapt. During the Soviet time the entire chain was governed from outside the 
chain. Especially in the early 1990s the government still sought to govern the entire 
sector, but failed to do so because the resources were inadequate and the previous 
methods of governance did not function any more. The fundamental change of the agro-
food sector was that new governing structures emerged gradually in the 1990s. First, 
there were food processing enterprises that were able to govern the chain, mainly 
because they possessed the required resources to invest and, by doing so, to adapt. 
Second, there were enterprise structures from outside the agro-food sector that entered 
the sector. Some of them have been involved in agriculture supplying farms with inputs. 
They possessed several critical assets. First, they had access to capital and that was very 
important because the banking system was not working properly. Second, they had 
information about the markets: prices and requirements. They had got involved in agro-
food markets perhaps by selling goods they received by barter from farms. Third, they 
often had the ability to organize critical functions of the value chain: storage, transport 
and logistics. Those parts of the value chain had been monopolies requiring political and 
economic power to deal with.  
I argue that the GCC approach can explain the differences in the performances of 
different agents. In addition, the constructed view of the Ukrainian agro-food sector 
contributes to the discussion on the GCC approach. In particular, it seems to be in line 
with Gibbon’s arguments that the agro-food sector in general cannot be regarded as a 
buyer driven. Moreover, this study points out some additonal explaining factors when 
we try to explain who is able to govern the chain. And at this point the FSU countries 
are slightly different from the countries studied previously and, consequently, we should 
extend or redefine some concepts of the GCC approach. First, we should also focus on 
the operating environment surrounding the agro-food sector and what are the assets of 
the agents to deal with the poorly defined property rights, authorities in general and 
monopolies, i.e. ill-functioning markets. In other words, apart from the distribution of 
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assets within the agro-food value chain, we should take the overall operating 
environment into account. Second, the access to capital is important in the economy 
without functioning banking system. And finally, we should not forget that different 
agents learn to operate in a market in various paces. The market was something new in 
Ukraine and the quick ability to adapt was certainly an asset. We obviously need to 
introduce a new group of assets and rents to describe the importance of social networks 
and political as well as economic power enabling the chain governance. Perhaps they 
could be called influence rents.  
As was pointed out in the introduction, the initial material set some limits to the 
research because the material had to cover the agro-food sector as widely as possible but 
without an opportunity to focus on some particular sub-sector. Still, I argue that as a 
first step to study the Ukrainian agro-food sector the approach has been fruitful even 
without focusing on some particular sector.  
Some observations can be made for further research. It should include, first, numerous 
interviews along some particular chain to get an in-depth view on the dynamics of the 
value chain. Second, the theoretical foundations of the GCC approach could be enriched 
by linking the studies of value chains to studies on institutions (see Brooks 1995: 
Gellynck et al 2002) and the economic networks in the post-socialist economies (see 
Grabher & Stark 1997). As I argued earlier, one important issue in explaining the 
positions of different agents is their political and economic power. This study sought to 
explain what agents of the chain are more likely to become the governors of the chain. 
Do they have the assets to overcome the inadequacies of transition economies, the 
poorly working banking sector being the best example. One question especially 
requiring further research is the unfavorable position of farms. Why their political 
power has been inadequate to carry out decent land reform? One answer could be that 
there so striking conflicting interests among farms and that they do not actually have 
any common interests to lobby. Further, the GCC approach could be enriched by linking 
it more intensively with geography. Some efforts have been made, but there is certainly 
room for further contribution (Hartwick 1998; Leslie & Reimer 1999).  
5.2 Discussion  
During the last couple of years Ukrainian agro-food sector has been able to recover. 
After the period on which this study focused, both agriculture and food processing 
industry increased their production.  The agricultural and food processing sector has 
clearly become more attractive in recent years. There are many reasons for this. The 
structural changes in the food processing industry and the growth in production over the 
last few years have been the consequence of new owners in the food industry, who have 
invested in companies and brought necessary know-how in marketing and management. 
The purchasing power has also developed favorably, particularly in larger cities. These 
issues have been of central importance to the development of the entire food processing 
chain. 
One of the background factors has been the changes taking place in the surrounding 
economy. The economy has begun amassing capital in search of investment targets. The 
banks’ willingness to lend money to the food processing industry has also increased. 
Agricultural policy has also been changed during the last few years, to less hinder the 
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activities in the agricultural sector. In December 1999, legislation concerning land and 
farm ownership was changed, improving the issue from the point of view of agriculture. 
Collective ownership of farms and land was discontinued. 
The growth of agricultural production has been focused on the successful and profitable 
sectors. The government’s possibilities to affect the profitability of production and the 
choice of produced goods, e.g. through agricultural support, are small. This is why 
production has been funneled into the profitable sectors, and the sown areas have 
increased. The growth in production within the profitable sectors has occurred mainly 
through an increase in sown areas; yield per hectare decreased for all significant 
cultivated plants. There is no change expected in the effort to focus production on the 
profitable sectors, since the freedom of the farms to decide for themselves increased 
further in 1999. Agriculture is increasingly guided by market mechanisms. 
In the last few years, the agricultural sector has been able to receive short-term loans for 
seasonal work. The profitability of agriculture has improved, and the majority of loans 
have been paid back. The new players in agriculture have enabled the availability of 
loans for agriculture. Loans for a few years, necessary for machinery acquisitions, are 
however still difficult to come by. 
The attractiveness of agriculture is based on good conditions for agriculture. The 
abasement of agriculture in the 1990s did not do away with many of the competitive 
advantages of agriculture. The land is still good and the climate favorable. During the 
last decade, the infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union deteriorated, and showed 
the uselessness of the planned economy operational models for large farms. The 
prerequisites for large-scale farming have not disappeared, but they presuppose 
changing the operational methods of large farms. The farms themselves have not 
become significantly more attractive. Effective operations require efficient management 
and up-dated technology. A positive development is largely based on capital flowing 
from outside agriculture, and also partly from outside the entire food processing chain.  
The operational models to be followed in agricultural markets are generally affected by 
the demand for wide-reaching control of the value chain. This applies to the food 
processing chain, as well as the sale and use of agricultural machinery. At the same 
time, the prerequisite for efficiency in primary production is making the whole 
production process more effective. These three issues affect the operational models that 
are applicable to the markets. 
The most important factors affecting the future development of agriculture and the food 
processing sector are probably visible already, although perhaps not yet dominating. 
Many factors deteriorating the development of agriculture and the food processing 
industry have partly been corrected. The demand for foodstuffs and agricultural 
products has grown. The government has lessened its interference with agricultural 
operations, although not stopped entirely. The operations of the value chain are 
increasingly based on free interaction between companies. The biggest problem has 
been the slowness of change at the farm level operational procedures, but it is 
compensated by the ability of agriculture to attract new entrepreneurs. There are strong 
arguments for a positive turn of development in agriculture and the foodstuffs sector. 
The problems of the surrounding economy are likely to remain significant factors 
hampering the development of the agro-food sector.    
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The most significant, possible change in agriculture is the liberation of selling and 
buying of agricultural land, postponed until 2004. Land reform is also not a certain 
guarantee for positive agricultural development. It would improve the farms’ 
possibilities of getting loans e.g. for machinery acquisitions, but does not remove other 
problems related to agricultural development. It does not make farming more profitable, 
nor does it increase demand for the final products. It also does not automatically make 
the farms any more honest debtors, even though the land would be accepted as 
collateral. The impact of the land reform would be positive, but successful operational 
models for agriculture have also been developed without it. The significance of 
company and farm-level solutions will also be emphasized in development during the 
next few years. A farm or company adjusting its activities to the current conditions can 
be profitable, but the operational models inherited from the age of planned economy do 
not have a future even if the agro-food sector as a whole were to grow.  
All sub-sectors within agriculture will not grow, even though overall production would. 
Sugar production demands in-depth restructuring. Sunflowers and grain have the best 
growth expectations. Increasing the yield per hectare back up to the level it was ten 
years ago, with the current sown area available, principally offers the opportunity to 
considerable harvest growth in the next few years. It calls for investments and increased 
use of inputs. Increasing crops require increased processing capacity. It is also likely 
that agents in each field – for example a grain producer – want to manage the value 
chain themselves by owning storage and processing capacity. Agriculture has not been 
able to invest in these functions on its own, but anyone becoming an agricultural 
entrepreneur is likely to produce as much added value as possible, i.e. governing the 
chain as completely as possible. 
The demand for foodstuffs in the domestic market is likely to undergo some positive 
development. This carries special significance for milk production. In order to increase 
production, the dairy industry must ensure primary milk production, which during the 
1990s diminished to such a degree that investments became necessary. Now milk can be 
collected to dairies from large as well as small farms. The dairy industry sets quality 
demands for the milk to be processed, and these cannot be met by primary production 
without investment. The industry’s position remains problematic regarding meat 
production and processing, since the self-sufficient production of meat from household 
plots and market place sales reduces the demand for meat and meat products processed 
by the industry. Growth and investments are expected in the sectors processing grain.  
Export will remain a significant factor steering the development within the sector. The 
changes occurred in the export of different products exemplify the factors threatening 
exports in the future. The export of sugar has crashed due to the poor competitiveness. 
The reason for the decrease of the export of sunflower seeds is the export tax. The 
unpredictability of the authorities’ operations and subsequent export limitations 
supported by domestic pressure groups will possibly occur also in the future. They limit 
the possibilities of the profitable sectors within agriculture to develop.  
The uncertainty factor in growing grain, from the point of view of primary production, 
is the management and inefficiency of storage and logistics. This decreases the share of 
primary production in export income, and has a negative impact on development. The 
aging storage and delivery equipment is unlikely to cause the entire export to crash, 
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since many companies depend on export and there is a market-based export 
infrastructure emerging. 
Export in the agricultural and foodstuffs sector is focused on products of a 
comparatively low level of processing. Ukraine is striving to raise the level of 
processing of the export, but is experiencing difficulty in retaining the competitive 
advantage in know-how- and technology- demanding processed goods. Grain has been 
exported to e.g. the Middle East, and sunflower seeds to EU countries. The most 
important export market for meat and processed goods has been Russia. The situation as 
a whole is unlikely to change without investments in the processing industry, which 
could raise the level of processing. 
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